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IDN homographs and Punycode

A domain name can imitate a known site using letters from another alphabet. How the attacker does it, what you see, and what to do.

On this page
  1. 1In 30 seconds
  2. 2What it is
  3. 3Straight answers
  4. 4Inside the attacker's head
  5. 5What you see on screen
  6. 6Under the hood
  7. 7Case files
  8. 8Sources
  9. 9Cite this article

In 30 seconds

Where it happens
In an email link that imitates a known site[2].
What the attacker wants
To get you to open a site that installs malware, or that pushes you to reveal a password or make a transfer[3].
The reflex
Use a password manager, since some recognize genuine sites and fill in nothing on a fake one; when manual entry becomes rare, a suspicious request stands out more easily[3].
If it is already done
Report the click immediately, even without certainty; the NCSC asks that no one be punished for clicking and then raising the alarm[3].
Article map

What it is

An IDN homograph is a domain name in which some letters are replaced by look-alike characters from another alphabet. MITRE ATT&CK describes attackers who use internationalized domain names (IDN) and different character sets, such as Cyrillic or Greek, to create lookalike domains, "visually similar lookalike domains" in the text, intended to deliver malware[1]. The link in an email can then look harmless while imitating a legitimate site thanks to special characters[2].

This article describes how the attacker obtains a lookalike domain, what it looks like to the employee, and what protects.

Straight answers

What is a homograph domain?

It is a lookalike domain built with characters from other alphabets, for example Cyrillic or Greek, that resemble those of the real name. MITRE calls it an "IDN homograph attack"[1].

Does the lookalike domain always use another alphabet?

No. According to MITRE, the attacker can also choose a domain close to the real one using homoglyphs or another top-level domain (TLD)[1]. The group EXOTIC LILY, for example, registered domains imitating the targeted organizations by changing the extension to ".us", ".co" or ".biz"[1].

How does the attacker obtain the domain?

A domain name can be bought and, in some cases, obtained for free[1]. Registries publish the holder's contact details, but private WHOIS services display those of a company instead, which hides the buyer[1]. The attacker can also buy an expired domain, which defenders have sometimes already classed as trustworthy based on its history[1].

Is a browser or a filter enough to protect me?

Not on its own. The UK NCSC notes that most recent browsers block known phishing sites, but not always on mobile[3]. It also recommends not relying entirely on the user's eye and combining technical protections with procedures[3].

Inside the attacker's head

The attacker starts by registering the domain. MITRE places this in the preparation phase of the attack: acquired domains are used for phishing, for compromise by simply visiting a site, and for controlling malware[1]. The attacker can create domains that are used only once[1] and vary the registration information and the registrars to blur the trail[1].

Imitations come in many forms. APT28 registered domains imitating NATO and OSCE security sites[1]. Scattered Spider registered domains to imitate corporate login portals[1]. Sandworm Team created names and addresses that imitate login pages for email, file sharing and password reset[1].

What you see on screen

The link usually comes with text that pushes you to click or to copy the address into a browser[2]. The visited site can exploit a browser flaw, or offer to download an application, a document, an archive or an executable depending on the email's pretext[2]. The email itself can spoof the sender, which deceives the recipient as well as filtering tools[4].

Other lures need no foreign alphabet. MITRE also cites an address where the name of a known site comes before another domain[1], and a host written as a number after an "@": the browser ignores the text placed before the "@"[2]. Here are neutralized illustrations.

Excerpt
Illustration, neutralized addresses, do not open.
Domain close to a news outlet's name: mail-newyorker[.]com
Known name placed at the start of a longer address: news12.com.recover-session-service[.]site
Text before the @ ignored, host written as a number: hxxp://google.com@1157586937

In the first two cases, MITRE attributes these domains to the group Magic Hound, which registered them to target specific victims[1]. The third example illustrates a phishing link[2].

Under the hoodIT teams

IDNs allow other character sets to be used, which the attacker uses to produce a visually close name[1].

  • On the company side, MITRE advises registering domains close to one's own to deter imitations, and monitoring domains created with a structure similar to one's own, including under another extension[1].
  • The SPF, DKIM and DMARC mechanisms are used to filter messages based on the validity of the sender's domain[4]. The NCSC adds that DMARC prevents phishers from spoofing the organization's domain[3].
  • On the employee side, some password managers recognize genuine sites and do not fill in fake ones[3].
  • Double verification through another channel (text message, phone call, logging in to an account, mail or meeting) protects important requests received by email[3].

Case filesReal cases

May 2021: a campaign attributed to NOBELIUM, under a fake agency address

Microsoft published its alert on May 27, 2021. It dates the start of the campaign to January 28, 2021, in the form of simple click-tracking pages, then a change of scale on May 25, 2021: NOBELIUM used the mass-mailing service Constant Contact and targeted about 3,000 accounts in more than 150 organizations[5]. In one variant, the email appears to come from USAID, but the actual sender address ends with the Constant Contact domain and a reply address in the agency's name is observed[5]. The link goes through the legitimate service then redirects to a subdomain containing "usaid", which delivers an ISO file[5].

Excerpt
Neutralized illustration of the path described by Microsoft, nothing to open.
Displayed sender: ashainfo@usaid[.]gov
First link: hxxps://r20[.]rs6[.]net/tn.jsp?f=
Redirect: hxxps://usaid[.]theyardservice[.]com/d/[recipient's address]

The ISO contains a shortcut, a fake PDF document shown to the victim and a DLL that serves as a loader for Cobalt Strike Beacon[5]. CISA and the FBI, for their part, count more than 7,000 accounts in about 350 organizations, and note that the campaign spoofed a US government organization[6]. CISA acknowledges that open sources attribute the activity to APT29, but states that it attributes it to no actor at this stage[6]. MITRE links the name NOBELIUM to the group APT29, which it attributes to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)[7].

None of these pages describes a homograph domain in this campaign: the lure relies on the displayed address and on a subdomain carrying the agency's name[5].

September 2013 to October 2019: Operation Ghost

MITRE dates APT29's Operation Ghost from September 2013 to October 2019[7]. In this campaign, APT29 registered domains for malware control, some of them "crafted to appear as existing legitimate domains"[1]. This case concerns malware communication and not a phishing email, but it shows the same name-imitation technique.

Sources

  1. MITRE ATT&CK, “Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, Sub-technique T1583.001 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  2. MITRE ATT&CK, “Phishing: Spearphishing Link, Sub-technique T1566.002 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  3. NCSC (UK), “Phishing attacks: defending your organisation”, 5 February 2018. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/phishing (accessed 10 November 2026)
  4. MITRE ATT&CK, “Phishing, Technique T1566 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  5. Microsoft, “New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM”, 27 May 2021. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  6. CISA, “Sophisticated Spearphishing Campaign Targets Government Organizations, IGOs, and NGOs”, 28 May 2021. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-148a (accessed 10 November 2026)
  7. MITRE ATT&CK, “APT29, IRON RITUAL, IRON HEMLOCK, NobleBaron, Dark Halo, NOBELIUM, UNC2452, YTTRIUM, The Dukes, Cozy Bear, CozyDuke, SolarStorm, Blue Kitsune, UNC3524, Midnight Blizzard, Group G0016 | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016/ (accessed 10 November 2026)