DoH and DNS hijacking
DNS turns a site name into an address. What DoH protects, and what an employee does when facing a suspect site.
On this page
In 30 seconds
- Where it happens
- Every time a site, a link or a mail service is opened, before the page even displays.
- What the attacker wants
- To alter the DNS answer so as to send traffic to infrastructure the attacker controls, then read or manipulate what passes through[2].
- The reflex
- Do not bypass the company's DNS, do not change the browser's DoH settings without the IT department's agreement, and report a suspicious page even if the padlock shows.
- If it is already done
- Tell the IT department, which can check the setting on the workstation.
What it is
DNS (Domain Name System) links a site name that someone types or clicks to the address of the server that hosts it: it translates domain names into IP addresses and the reverse[1]. When this translation is falsified, the employee types the right address and still ends up on another server.
This page covers DoH and DNS hijacking. None of these mechanisms removes the need to look at a page with suspicion.
Straight answers
What is DNS for?
It translates a domain name into an IP address, and the reverse. The information is spread across name servers, each of which knows a small part of the namespace, and it is meant to be available to any computer on the Internet[1].
What happens when a DNS answer is falsified?
The browser receives an address chosen by the attacker. In the campaign described by CISA, the attacker modifies DNS records (address, mail or name server) to replace a service's legitimate address with an address the attacker controls[2]. The traffic then goes through the attacker's infrastructure, where it can be manipulated or inspected before being passed on to the real service, if the attacker decides to do so[2].
What does DoH bring?
With DoH (DNS over HTTPS), DNS queries go through an encrypted HTTPS connection instead of travelling in clear, which protects them from interception by untrusted third parties[4].
Does the browser padlock guarantee the site is the right one?
No, not in the case described by CISA. Because the attacker sets the values of the records, the attacker can also obtain valid encryption certificates for the organization's domain names. The redirected traffic can then be decrypted, and since the certificate is valid for the domain, the user receives no warning[2].
How it works
A workstation queries a DNS resolver, that is, a server that looks for the answer to the question "which address matches this name?"[5]. The meaning of the answer therefore depends on two things: the server queried, and the integrity of the records it consults.
In its March 2026 version, NIST recalls that an attack on a company's DNS infrastructure threatens all of that company's network operations[3]. The guide provides deployment guidance to secure the DNS protocol and infrastructure[3].
On the defence side, the UK NCSC offers a protective resolver (PDNS) that prevents access to known malicious domains by simply not resolving them[5]. Its rules are built from malicious domains spotted in commercial, internal and open sources, then reviewed to avoid blocking legitimate sites[5]. For employees who work remotely, an option called PDNS Roaming sends DNS traffic to PDNS using DoH, including outside the office network[5]. Encrypting the path and filtering can therefore be combined, provided the organization is the one choosing the resolver.
What you do
- Keep the DNS provided by the company. Do not replace it with another server in the settings of your workstation or browser, even for a service presented as faster or more private.
- Do not change the DoH settings of the browser or the system without the IT department's agreement. Under Windows Server 2022, a group policy lets the administrator allow, forbid or require DoH[4]: this setting is managed at the organization level.
- A page that looks odd to you (unexpected address, request for credentials, unusual appearance) should be reported, even with a padlock. The padlock does not prove that DNS has not been hijacked[2].
- If you entered credentials on such a page, tell the IT department without delay: hijacked traffic can expose the data entered by the user[2].
- If your workstation shows a block page, do not try to bypass it: the NCSC describes this block as an intended result for a domain known to be malicious[5].
Pitfalls
The first pitfall is believing that encrypting is enough. DoH protects the query against interception during the trip[4]. In the 2019 campaign, the starting point is a compromised account able to modify the records[2].
The second pitfall lies in the setting itself. The Windows Server DNS client offers an "encrypted preferred, unencrypted allowed" mode: if DoH is not possible, it falls back to queries in clear without any notification[4]. A user can therefore wrongly believe that their queries are encrypted. The DNS server chosen on the workstation also determines who receives the queries: the Windows Server client is set to DoH only if the interface's primary or secondary DNS server is in the list of known DoH servers, and Windows knows by default servers from Cloudflare, Google and Quad9[4]. A workstation whose queries go anywhere other than to the organization's resolver does not go through the filtering the organization has put in place, for example the NCSC's, which relies on the resolver[5]. Hence the rule not to change these settings alone.
The third pitfall is the DNS tunnel. According to MITRE ATT&CK, attackers communicate with systems they control by hiding data in the fields of DNS packets, to blend in with usual traffic[6]. The commands sent to the remote system, and often their results, are embedded in the DNS traffic between the client and the server[6]. This traffic is very common and can even be allowed before network authentication is complete[6]. DNS beacons, which rarely communicate with infected devices, are hard to spot[6]. MITRE also notes that queries to retrieve a command infrastructure can be encapsulated in encrypted HTTPS packets (DoH), and cites Brute Ratel C4, a tool able to use DoH for this purpose[7]. For the employee, this means that DNS encryption is not a sign of trust in itself.
Real cases
January 2019: the global DNS hijacking campaign
On 24 January 2019, CISA publishes an alert (AA19-024A) on a global campaign of DNS infrastructure hijacking[2]. The attacker starts by compromising the credentials of an account able to modify DNS records, or obtains them otherwise[2]. The attacker then replaces a service's legitimate address with an address the attacker controls, and obtains valid certificates for the organization's domain names[2]. Web and mail traffic was thus redirected and intercepted, and other network services could have been[2].
Two days earlier, on 22 January 2019, CISA had issued emergency directive ED 19-01: it states that several federal agency domains were affected[8]. It requires, within 10 business days, auditing public DNS records, changing the passwords of accounts that can modify them, enabling multifactor authentication on those accounts, and monitoring certificate transparency logs to spot certificates that were not requested[8]. CISA later closed this directive, considering its objective met[8].
Sea Turtle and LAPSUS$: name server hijackings
MITRE ATT&CK lists two other cases of DNS record modification. Sea Turtle modified name server records to send victims to DNS servers it controlled and to provide the answers to all lookups[9]. LAPSUS$ reconfigured a victim's DNS records to point to domains and sites it controlled[9]. MITRE specifies that this technique is hard to counter with preventive measures, because it takes place outside the perimeter of the company's defences[9].
Sources
- NIST, “Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide”, 18 September 2013. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/81/2/final (accessed 10 November 2026)
- CISA, “DNS Infrastructure Hijacking Campaign”, 24 January 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa19-024a (accessed 10 November 2026)
- NIST, “Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide”, 19 March 2026. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/81/r3/final (accessed 10 November 2026)
- Microsoft, “Secure DNS Client over HTTPS (DoH)”. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/dns/doh-client-support (accessed 10 November 2026)
- NCSC (UK), “Protective Domain Name Service (PDNS)”, 17 August 2017. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/pdns (accessed 10 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Application Layer Protocol: DNS, Sub-technique T1071.004 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Protocol Tunneling, Technique T1572 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
- CISA, “ED 19-01: Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering (Closed)”, 22 January 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/ed-19-01-mitigate-dns-infrastructure-tampering-closed (accessed 10 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Compromise Infrastructure: DNS Server, Sub-technique T1584.002 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/002/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
Cite this article
Brain, “DoH and DNS hijacking”, Cyberpedia, 2026. https:/
BibTeX
@misc{brain_cp223_en_2026,
author = {Brain},
title = {DoH and DNS hijacking},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {Cyberpedia},
url = {https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/dnssec-doh-dot-encrypted-dns/},
note = {CC BY 4.0}
}