Bank detail change fraud
A scammer posing as a supplier sends a new bank account. How to spot the fraud and check before you pay.
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In 30 seconds
- Where it happens
- Usually by phone, by electronic messages, or both, and in every type of organisation[2].
- What the attacker wants
- To divert a transfer by impersonating the victim's creditor[1].
- The reflex
- For any new bank details received by message, call the creditor on their usual number so they confirm the message and the details[1].
What it is
Bank detail change fraud tricks a person into making a transfer to a bank account held by a scammer. According to Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr[1], the scammer impersonates a creditor the victim already deals with (a tradesperson, notary, lawyer, owner or landlord). This scam often follows the hacking of an email account, either the creditor's or the victim's[1].
The scheme has variants. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr[2] describes the fake transfer order scam (FOVI, from the French "faux ordres de virement"), in which the scammer may pose as a company head (known in French as the "arnaque au Président"), as a supplier who provides new bank details, or as an employee asking to change the account where their salary is paid[2].
Straight answers
What exactly is a fake bank detail notice?
In general, the scammer attaches to their message an invoice with a falsified bank detail slip (RIB) containing the details of an account they hold[1]. They have spotted an imminent or recurring transaction between the creditor and the victim, then ask for payment by transfer[1].
Why can the message look genuine?
Proofpoint[4] observed that many attacks of this kind start from a legitimate email account that has been compromised. A message sent from that account passes email authentication checks (DKIM, SPF, DMARC), because it comes from a real account[4]. According to Proofpoint[4], the fraudulent emails in the example it analyses contained no attachment and no link.
What should you do before paying a new account?
Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr[1] says to call the creditor on their usual number. For organisations, Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr[2] recommends an internal verification and hierarchical validation procedure with no exceptions for unexpected transfer requests or changes of bank details, and clear procedures for authorised staff[2]. Proofpoint[5] also mentions verification by calling back on contact details already known[5].
What if the transfer has gone through?
Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr[1] lists the steps: alert the bank, alert the creditor whose identity was impersonated, keep the evidence, check the mailbox settings (redirections, filtering rules), change the password, then file a complaint[1]. For an organisation, the fact sheet also asks to identify all transfers executed, pending or upcoming to the fraudulent details, to inform management and the accounting department, and to request that these details be blocked in business applications[2].
What does the law say?
Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr[1] points out that fraud (article 313-1 of the French Penal Code) is punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of 375,000 euros. If the victim's mailbox was hacked, fraudulent access to an automated data processing system (article 323-1) is punishable by three years' imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 euros[1].
Inside the attacker's head
The scammer starts by looking for a transaction to divert. According to Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr[1], they identify an imminent or recurring payment between the creditor and the victim. Proofpoint[5] describes the first phases of a BEC attack: building a list of targets (LinkedIn profiles, business address databases, websites), then sending the first messages while impersonating names or similar domains[5].
A hacked legitimate account is highly sought after. Proofpoint[4] explains that it allows in-depth reconnaissance. In the case of a hacked employee account, Proofpoint[5] writes that attackers typically stay in it for weeks to study exchanges and internal processes before acting[5].
Once the transaction is spotted, the attacker inserts themselves into the ongoing conversation thread (Proofpoint calls this "thread hijacking"), which lends more credibility to their message[4]. They can then add a lookalike account in reply or in copy, with a similar domain (Proofpoint cites supp1ier.com instead of supplier.com). This lets them continue the exchange even if the compromised account is cleaned up[4]. The scammer's bank account is often located abroad[2].
What you see on screen
In the example Proofpoint[4] analyses, the attacker hijacks an existing conversation thread: the message arrives in an exchange already under way[4]. Proofpoint[4] gives the example of requests to change bank account justified by an audit or by COVID-19, which look plausible in a thread already under way[4]. In general, the attached invoice carries a falsified bank detail slip[1].
In the example it analyses, Proofpoint[4] notes a message that mixes authority and urgency, two classic levers of these attacks[4]. Proofpoint[5] lists signals to watch for:
- a request that bypasses the usual channels: most organisations have an accounting system through which invoices and payments must pass, even when urgent[5];
- a request to keep the matter confidential or to communicate with the sender only by email[5];
- a domain or reply address that does not match the sender, for example yourc0mpany.com instead of yourcompany.com[5].
These signals are not always enough, because a message sent from a genuinely hacked account is very hard for the user to spot[4]. Hence the reflex of calling a known number.
Under the hoodIT teams
Supplier invoice attacks rely mostly on spoofing and account compromise, techniques that are not technically sophisticated, according to Proofpoint[4]. Spoofing can target the account itself or the domain (imitated domains)[4]. In a hacked account, attackers often create mailbox rules to hide their actions and keep lasting access[5]. This is why Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr[1] asks to check that there are no redirections or filtering rules, and to photograph them before deleting them[1].
According to Proofpoint[5], BEC attacks are hard to detect because they use neither malware nor malicious web addresses[5]. To reduce the risk, Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr[2] also recommends limiting the publication of information that allows identifying and contacting the staff authorised to request transfers or changes of bank details, using strong passwords and enabling two-factor authentication on mailboxes[2].
Case filesReal cases
February 2020: nearly 400,000 dollars avoided
According to Proofpoint[4], a US public figure nearly lost almost 400,000 US dollars in a supplier invoicing attack in February 2020. The funds were recovered before the attackers touched them[4]. Proofpoint[4] specifies that this outcome is rare: these frauds seldom end with the funds being recovered.
2013 to 2015: 121 million dollars at Facebook and Google
Proofpoint[5] reports that a fraud targeting Facebook and Google caused 121 million dollars in losses between 2013 and 2015. Evaldas Rimasauskas had created a fake company imitating a hardware supplier and used fake contracts and lawyers' letters so that banks would accept the fraudulent transfers[5].
3 to 5 August 2026: a campaign detected by Microsoft
In a post published on 10 September 2026, Microsoft[6] describes a campaign detected from 3 to 5 August, with more than a million emails targeting business users, 87.7% of them in the United States[6]. The attacker posed as CEOs and tried to convince accounts payable departments to process an ACH payment of nearly 50,000 dollars[6]. To add credibility, the emails included a thread presented as forwarded and a fake ServiceNow invoice, whose payment method was a transfer to accounts controlled by the attacker[6]. Microsoft[6] found no evidence that ServiceNow was compromised or involved.
Microsoft[6] points out signs of forgery: the headers of the supposedly forwarded thread were missing, the display name did not match the sender's address, and the earlier messages were left-aligned, whereas in real threads they are normally indented or visually grouped[6]. The domain imitating ServiceNow had been registered on 31 July, shortly before the campaign[6].
Sources
- Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr, “Que faire en cas de fraude au virement ou au « faux RIB » ?”, 25 May 2023. https://www.cybermalveillance.gouv.fr/tous-nos-contenus/fiches-reflexes/que-faire-en-cas-de-fraude-au-virement-ou-au-faux-rib (accessed 14 November 2026)
- Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr, “La fraude au virement bancaire (FOVI) ou au faux ordre de virement”, 27 January 2021. https://www.cybermalveillance.gouv.fr/tous-nos-contenus/fiches-reflexes/escroquerie-faux-ordres-virement-fovi (accessed 14 November 2026)
- NCSC (UK), “Business payment fraud”. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/respond-recover/business-payment-fraud (accessed 14 November 2026)
- Proofpoint, “Understanding BEC Scams: Supplier Invoicing Fraud | Proofpoint UK”, 7 December 2020. https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/blog/cybersecurity-essentials/understanding-bec-scams-supplier-invoicing-fraud (accessed 14 November 2026)
- Proofpoint, “What Is BEC? - Business Email Compromise Defined | Proofpoint US”, 24 January 2021. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/business-email-compromise (accessed 14 November 2026)
- Microsoft, “Protecting organizations from AI-assisted executive impersonation and invoice fraud”, 10 September 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/10/protecting-organizations-ai-assisted-executive-impersonation-invoice-fraud/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
Cite this article
Brain, “Bank detail change fraud”, Cyberpedia, 2026. https:/
BibTeX
@misc{brain_cp034_en_2026,
author = {Brain},
title = {Bank detail change fraud},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {Cyberpedia},
url = {https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/bank-detail-change-fraud/},
note = {CC BY 4.0}
}