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Found USB drive: the bait that infects

A USB drive found or received may be booby-trapped: what happens when it is plugged in, three dated campaigns and the right reflex.

On this page
  1. 1In 30 seconds
  2. 2What it is
  3. 3Straight answers
  4. 4Inside the attacker's head
  5. 5What you see on screen
  6. 6Under the hood
  7. 7Case files
  8. 8Sources
  9. 9Cite this article

In 30 seconds

Where it happens
In places people pass through, as Microsoft puts it[1]. In the SOGU campaign (Campaign 22-054), Mandiant identified print shops and hotels as possible infection points[2].
What the attacker wants
To steal information in the espionage campaigns Mandiant described in 2023[2], or money in the UNC4990 campaign, which is probably financially motivated[3].
The reflex
Do not plug in a USB device that is not yours. A drive you find goes to the reception desk or the lost and found[1].
If it is already done
Run a security scan of the device right away[1].

What it is

Baiting means leaving a booby-trapped device, most often a USB drive, where someone will find it. Microsoft writes that attackers deliberately leave infected USB devices in busy places, hoping that someone will find them and plug them into their computer[1]. Microsoft calls this a "USB drop attack"[1].

This entry describes what happens when the drive is plugged in, what the victim sees, then three dated cases.

Straight answers

What is a "USB drop attack"?

It is the name Microsoft gives to the practice of leaving infected USB devices in busy places so that someone finds them and plugs them in[1].

What is the risk of plugging in a drive you found?

Microsoft states that many worms spread by infecting removable media, and that the malware can install itself automatically when the infected media is connected[1]. In the SOGU campaign described by Mandiant, running a legitimate executable found on the drive loads a malicious DLL[2]. In the UNC4990 cases, the infection starts when the victim double-clicks a malicious LNK shortcut placed on the drive[3].

What should you do with a drive you found?

Do not plug it in. According to Microsoft, a device you do not plug in cannot infect the computer[1]. If the drive seems to have been lost, Microsoft advises handing it to someone at reception or to the lost and found[1]. It also recommends being wary of any USB device you do not own[1].

And if the drive is already plugged in?

Microsoft says to run a security scan of the device immediately[1].

Can the trap arrive by mail?

Yes. According to MITRE ATT&CK, FIN7 actors mailed USB drives containing malware to potential victims. The malware installed backdoors, in some cases for ransomware operations[4].

Can a phone or a cable be used as bait?

MITRE ATT&CK states that mobile devices can infect a PC connected over USB, and that in some cases USB charging cables can be used for this[4].

What can the company do?

Mandiant says organizations should first restrict access to external devices such as USB drives. If that is not possible, they should at least scan them before connecting them to the internal network[2]. MITRE ATT&CK lists other measures: on Windows 10, enable attack surface reduction (ASR) rules to block the execution of unsigned or untrusted executable files from USB drives; disable Autorun if it is not needed; ban or restrict removable media through organizational policy if the business does not require them; limit the use of USB devices on the network[4].

Inside the attacker's head

The trap rests on a simple assumption: someone will eventually plug the object in. Motives vary by actor. Mandiant assesses that TEMP.Hex, a China-linked actor, probably carried out its USB attacks to collect information in support of Chinese national security and economic interests[2]. By contrast, Mandiant judges UNC4990 to be probably motivated by financial gain[3].

The drive is also a way to reach networks with no Internet access. MITRE ATT&CK describes actors who copy malware onto removable media to cross to systems that may sit on isolated networks, known as "air-gapped" networks[4]. For the USBStealer malware, MITRE writes that APT28 has used it since at least 2005 to extract information from isolated networks[5].

In UNC4990, a unique identifier for each infection was added after the campaign began, to track infected machines[3].

What you see on screen

In all the UNC4990 cases Mandiant responded to, the infection began when the victim double-clicked a malicious LNK shortcut placed on a USB drive[3]. The shortcut name usually repeated the brand of the drive and its capacity in parentheses, for example "KINGSTON (32GB).lnk", or the drive name, for example "D (32GB).lnk"[3]. Its icon was the one Windows displays by default for a drive, probably to encourage a double-click[3]. The shortcut launches a PowerShell script with a hidden window[3].

The QUIETBOARD malware, which accompanies this campaign, prepares the drives it infects. It creates a hidden folder on the drive, moves the existing data into it and adds a fake shortcut that imitates the Windows drive icon[3]. The folder name contains a Unicode character ("Hangul Filler") that displays as a space, so the path looks like "D:"[3].

In the SNOWYDRIVE campaign, the victim is lured into clicking a malicious file disguised as a legitimate executable[2].

Another staging: the drive that poses as a keyboard. MITRE ATT&CK notes that FIN7 used malicious USB drives that acted as virtual keyboards to install malware[4].

Under the hoodIT teams

A classic mechanism is automatic execution: MITRE ATT&CK describes actors who copy malware onto removable media and take advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted[4]. The Agent.btz malware, for example, copies itself onto removable media and creates an autorun.inf file that orders that file to run[4]. Variants of Conficker used the Windows AUTORUN feature to spread over USB[4]. MITRE also describes another method: copying the malware under a name that makes it look like a legitimate file, to push the user into running it on another system[4].

In the SOGU campaign, the chain Mandiant observed usually has three files: a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL library and an encrypted payload[2]. The legitimate executables are often security programs (Avast, Smadav or Symantec)[2]. When the executable is launched, it loads the malicious DLL, which runs the payload in memory[2]. The malware can also copy itself onto new removable media plugged into the infected machine, which lets it spread and, potentially, collect data from isolated systems[2].

USBStealer copies itself onto the media and relies on Autorun to run the malicious file when the user opens the media on another system[5]. It imitates a legitimate Russian program named USB Disk Security[5].

In 2014, researchers announced another risk. According to ESET, Karsten Nohl of SR Labs explained that the control chips of USB devices can be spoofed, and that USB drives can be reprogrammed to pose as other types of devices in order to take control of a computer[6]. At the time of that article, ESET's David Harley pointed out that no such device was known "in the wild"[6].

Case filesReal cases

First half of 2023: three times more attacks through infected drives

In a post dated July 11, 2023, Mandiant writes that it observed, in the first half of 2023, a threefold increase in the number of attacks using infected USB drives to steal secrets[2]. According to Mandiant, most of the incidents came from several active campaigns affecting the public and private sectors worldwide[2].

Two campaigns are detailed. The first spreads the SOGU malware by USB drives across many sectors and countries. Mandiant attributes it to TEMP.Hex and rates it among the most aggressive ones targeting public and private organizations[2]. The second, SNOWYDRIVE, targets oil and gas companies in Asia and is attributed to UNC4698. The malware creates a backdoor that allows commands to be sent remotely, and it copies itself onto other drives[2].

In the SOGU campaign, Mandiant identifies print shops and hotels as possible infection points[2]. It finds the SOGU campaign rather opportunistic[2].

January 2024: the UNC4990 campaign

In a post dated January 30, 2024, Mandiant describes UNC4990, an actor that makes heavy use of USB drives for initial infection. It mainly targets users in Italy, is probably motivated by money, and the campaign has been running since at least 2020[3]. It affects organizations in several sectors, including healthcare, transport, construction and logistics[3].

The malicious script retrieves its components from well-known sites: GitHub, GitLab, Vimeo, then Ars Technica. An encoded payload was placed in the description of a Vimeo video uploaded on March 5, 2023, then, from November 27, 2023, in the profile of an Ars Technica account created on November 23, 2023[3].

Among the tools deployed, the QUIETBOARD malware monitors the clipboard: it spots cryptocurrency wallet addresses and replaces them with the attacker's[3]. In one infection, after months of simple beaconing, it installed a mining program[3].

Examples listed by MITRE ATT&CK

MITRE ATT&CK lists malware that spreads through removable media: Stuxnet, by an autorun.inf file or the LNK vulnerability CVE-2010-2568, and Raspberry Robin, which has historically used infected USB drives to reach new victims[4]. Among MITRE's references is a January 7, 2022 article titled "FBI: FIN7 hackers target US companies with BadUSB devices to install ransomware"[4].

Sources

  1. Microsoft, “How malware can infect your PC”. https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/how-malware-can-infect-your-pc (accessed 14 November 2026)
  2. Google, “The Spies Who Loved You: Infected USB Drives to Steal Secrets”, 11 July 2023. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/infected-usb-steal-secrets/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  3. Google, “Evolution of UNC4990: Uncovering USB Malware's Hidden Depths”, 30 January 2024. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc4990-evolution-usb-malware/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  4. MITRE ATT&CK, “Replication Through Removable Media”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  5. MITRE ATT&CK, “USBStealer”. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  6. ESET, “Malware: Every USB port is "defenseless" against new scam”, 31 July 2014. https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/07/31/malware/ (accessed 14 November 2026)