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Whaling and CEO fraud: targeting executives

How scammers target executives or pose as them to get an urgent bank transfer, and how an employee can respond.

On this page
  1. 1In 30 seconds
  2. 2What it is
  3. 3Straight answers
  4. 4Inside the attacker's head
  5. 5What you see on screen
  6. 6Under the hood
  7. 7Case files
  8. 8Sources
  9. 9Cite this article

In 30 seconds

Where it happens
By phone, by electronic messages, or both[1].
What the attacker wants
To get money paid into a bank account held by cybercriminals[1].
The reflex
Confirm the request by calling a known contact, using a number that does not come from the message received[2], and do not bypass the internal hierarchical verification and validation procedure that allows no exception[1].
If it has already happened
Tell your manager, the accounting department and the bank right away, and file a complaint alongside the steps taken with the bank[1].
Article map

What it is

Whaling and CEO fraud end the same way: a transfer nobody had planned, requested in the name of an executive. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr files these frauds under the scam of fake transfer orders (FOVI in French), which uses persuasion, threats or various forms of pressure to get the victim to make an unplanned transfer of funds[1]. When the request is presented as coming from an executive and as urgent and confidential, it is called the President scam[1].

For an accounting employee, everything happens in one message or call that seems to come from management. The CNIL states that this attack can affect any company, whatever its size and sector of activity[2]. According to Proofpoint, the two terms are often used interchangeably: whaling targets executives themselves, while CEO fraud uses their identity to push other employees into acting[3].

Straight answers

What is the difference between whaling, CEO fraud and FOVI?

FOVI is the general category: an unplanned transfer obtained through pressure[1]. CEO fraud is the variant in which the request seems to come from an executive[1]. Whaling is a form of phishing that targets senior executives directly, such as CEOs or chief financial officers[3].

Why are they writing to me rather than to the executive?

According to Proofpoint, attackers know that executives are trained to spot threats. They therefore aim instead at an employee who is easier to manipulate and who may have the authority to order a transfer[4]. The emails often target specific departments, such as human resources or accounts payable[4].

An executive asks me for an urgent, confidential transfer: what should I do?

The CNIL recommends contacting the company's known contacts by phone or in person, and not with the contact details given in the email, to have the payment request or the change of bank details confirmed[2]. CISA states that, if the bank contacts the company to verify a transfer, staff should delay the transaction until further checks are made[5]. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr recommends that organisations set up an internal hierarchical validation procedure, with no exceptions, for unexpected transfers[1].

What if the transfer has already been sent?

Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr recommends identifying all transfers executed, pending or upcoming to the scammer's account, informing the hierarchy and the accounting department, and asking for these bank details to be blocked in the business applications[1]. If the transfer has not yet been made, the accounting department should be contacted immediately to suspend it[1]. If it has gone out, the bank should be alerted and asked to recall the funds. According to the same guide, filing a complaint will be necessary and will improve the chances of recovering the money[1].

Evidence should also be kept: phone numbers, messages received, transfer orders and invoices[1]. If the fraud may have been made possible by the hacking of an email account, its password should be changed immediately[1]. The complaint is filed at a police station, a gendarmerie, or in writing to the public prosecutor, as soon as possible after the scam is identified[1]. Proofpoint also advises reporting the message to the people in charge of cybersecurity, who can alert other employees[4].

What does the scammer risk?

According to Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr, scamming is an offence punishable by five years' imprisonment and a fine of 375,000 euros, and an attempt is punishable by the same penalties[1]. Depending on the case, identity theft and fraudulent access to a computer system may also be charged[1].

Inside the attacker's head

The attack starts with research on the company. According to the CNIL, information found online makes it possible to identify fairly precisely the company's sector, its customers and its suppliers. Job postings and organisation charts show who works in which department and how the chain of decision is organised[2]. Proofpoint adds that attackers use company web pages and LinkedIn to collect the names of executives, their email addresses and the invoicing systems. This phase can last several days[4].

The attacker then registers a domain name close to that of the company, of a supplier or of a well-known tax authority[2]. They create an address in the name of the CEO or another senior executive, then write to the targeted person to ask them to send money[4].

Another route is to take control of a real mailbox. CISA describes cases where the account of the CEO or the chief financial officer is compromised in order to write to an employee able to carry out transfers. Before acting, the attacker observes the company's exchanges and its executives' travel. In some cases, they had the emails received by the victim forwarded automatically to an address of their own[5].

The attacker relies on urgency. According to Proofpoint, if the target has too much time to think, they may realise it is a scam[4]. For executives targeted directly, whaling often begins with low-risk exchanges that build trust before the financial requests[3].

What you see on screen

The message presents itself as an urgent request, supposedly approved at the top, that pushes you to pay without delay[2]. The example below is a neutralised illustration: the address is fictitious and the content is paraphrased.

Excerpt
Illustration (neutralised address, paraphrased message)
From: [email protected]
Subject: [transfer request presented as urgent and confidential]
[the message asks for an immediate payment to an account given in the text]

The warning signs come down to a few points:

  • A domain name that differs by one character or by the extension from the official domain, such as "enterprise" or "entrreprise" in place of "entreprise"[2].
  • An unexpected transfer request, or a change of bank details for a supplier or an employee[1].
  • Urgency and confidentiality put forward[1].
  • A text that is not necessarily long or well written: according to Proofpoint, urgency makes people overlook these flaws[4].
  • A phone call from someone claiming to be the organisation's accountant, to increase the pressure[4].

The scammer's bank account is often located abroad[1]. A fake invoice, consistent with an order in progress, may also invite you to pay into the cybercriminals' account[2].

Under the hoodIT teams

The CNIL describes two techniques for building the fake domain. Typosquatting registers a close name by changing one character, like a typing mistake. Cybersquatting changes, for example, the extension, from entreprise.fr to entreprise.com[2]. The email is then a case of targeted phishing ("spear phishing"), fed with background information to make it credible, such as a payment or an order in progress[2].

The attack can also start from an internal address. If an employee's login and password pair has been stolen, the criminal can write from their real mailbox, which makes the order given look legitimate[2]. CISA specifies that, when the attacker uses a deceptive address, the difference is very subtle and can easily pass for the legitimate address[5].

Business email compromise (BEC) frauds often contain no booby-trapped link or attachment, which makes them hard to spot, according to Proofpoint[6]. Proofpoint also notes that generative AI can be used to write fake emails that imitate a person's style, tone and signature: "Bad actors can use GenAI to write fake emails and texts that mimic the style, tone, and signature of a spoofed individual."[3]

Case filesReal cases

Sefri-Cime, December 2022

Sefri-Cime, a Paris property developer, was targeted in December 2022 by an international CEO fraud gang. The group stole 38 million euros in a single scam, then laundered them through bank accounts in several countries, including China and Israel[6]. The chief financial officer received an email from someone presenting themselves as a lawyer at a well-known French accounting firm. Within a few days, the fraudster had won their trust and obtained successful requests for large, urgent transfers of several million euros[6].

Cottage Grove (Minnesota), 2021

The city of Cottage Grove hired the company Genslinger & Sons for a sewer project in mid-2021. A few months later, the city's accounting specialist wrote to an incorrect address on the "genslingerandsons.com" domain. Five days later, a fraudster posing as the company's president asked them to update the payment information[6]. The city sent two large payments to the new account, 1.2 million dollars in total. The theft was only discovered a few months later, when the company asked for its payments, and the city learned that the real executive had been on vacation for weeks[6].

An Australian hedge fund, 2020

In 2020, an Australian hedge fund lost 8.7 million dollars when one of its co-founders opened a fake Zoom invitation. It installed malicious code that generated fake invoices in the fund's email system[3].

A Belgian bank, 2016

In 2016, a Belgian bank lost 75 million dollars after cybercriminals targeted its CEO during a routine internal audit[3].

Sources

  1. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr, “La fraude au virement bancaire (FOVI) ou au faux ordre de virement”, 27 January 2021. https://www.cybermalveillance.gouv.fr/tous-nos-contenus/fiches-reflexes/escroquerie-faux-ordres-virement-fovi (accessed 14 November 2026)
  2. CNIL, “Le faux ordre de virement international ou « fraude au président »”, 9 April 2021. https://www.cnil.fr/fr/le-faux-ordre-de-virement-international-ou-fraude-au-president (accessed 14 November 2026)
  3. Proofpoint, “What Is Whaling Phishing? Definition | Proofpoint US”, 5 March 2025. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/whaling (accessed 14 November 2026)
  4. Proofpoint, “What Is CEO Fraud? - About Attacks, Prevention & More | Proofpoint US”, 9 December 2021. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/ceo-fraud (accessed 14 November 2026)
  5. CISA, “Business Email Compromise Continues to Swindle and Defraud U.S. Businesses | CISA”. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2015/06/24/business-email-compromise-continues-swindle-and-defraud-us-businesses (accessed 14 November 2026)
  6. Proofpoint, “10 Real-World Examples of BEC Scams & Attacks | Proofpoint US”, 22 September 2023. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/email-and-cloud-threats/10-real-world-business-email-compromise-bec-scam-examples (accessed 14 November 2026)