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UEFI bootkits: malware that survives a reinstall

A UEFI bootkit runs before Windows, undermines antivirus and can survive a reinstall: dated cases and what employees should do.

On this page
  1. 1In 30 seconds
  2. 2What it is
  3. 3Straight answers
  4. 4Inside the attacker's head
  5. 5What you see on screen
  6. 6Under the hood
  7. 7Case files
  8. 8Sources
  9. 9Cite this article

In 30 seconds

Where it happens
On a computer where the attacker already has privileged or physical access. Microsoft states that BlackLotus is neither a first-stage payload nor an initial access vector[1].
What the attacker wants
To stay in place and evade protections. Microsoft describes the use of this bootkit as mainly a persistence and defense evasion mechanism[1].
The reflex
Keep the computer and its firmware up to date, tell IT about a computer that is lost or handed to a third party, and never reuse it without IT's help. ESET recommends always using the latest firmware version and a well-configured system with Secure Boot enabled[3].
If it has already happened
Tell IT right away. Microsoft recommends removing an infected device from the network, then reformatting it (system partition and EFI partition) or restoring it from a clean backup that includes the EFI partition[1].

What it is

A UEFI bootkit is malicious software that installs itself in the computer's startup phase. Microsoft explains that these bootkits run at startup, before the operating system loads, and can therefore interfere with or disable protections such as BitLocker, HVCI and Microsoft Defender Antivirus[1].

According to CISA, a compromise of the UEFI can persist after a restart and after an operating system reinstall, whereas most incident response practices treat a reinstalled system as a clean device[2].

Straight answers

Does a bootkit really survive a Windows reinstall?

CISA lists reinstalling the operating system among the cases in which a UEFI compromise can persist[2]. ESET describes the BlackLotus case: if the vulnerable binaries were revoked after installation, the bootkit would remain functional, because it relies on a legitimate shim and on an attacker-controlled MOK key. The safest measure would then be to reinstall Windows and remove that key with the mokutil utility, which requires physical presence[4]. Microsoft recommends reformatting both the system partition and the EFI partition[1].

Why is antivirus not enough?

Because the bootkit starts before it does[1]. BlackLotus modifies the entry points of WdBoot.sys and WdFilter.sys, two Windows Defender drivers, so that they stop immediately[4]. The driver also tries to disarm the main Windows Defender process, MsMpEng.exe, but ESET considers this function poorly implemented: restarting MsMpEng.exe makes it ineffective[4]. Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the known BlackLotus components from the fingerprints of known samples[1].

Can you catch it by opening a booby-trapped email?

Not directly: this bootkit can only be deployed on a device where the attacker has already obtained privileged or physical access[1]. Among the earlier steps, Microsoft cites initial access through phishing, credential compromise and privilege escalation[1].

Does Secure Boot protect you?

Not by itself. In March 2023, ESET showed that BlackLotus runs on a fully up-to-date Windows 11 with Secure Boot enabled[4]. It exploits CVE-2022-21894, which Microsoft fixed in January 2022, but whose vulnerable binaries had not yet been added to the UEFI revocation list[4]. Microsoft still recommends using Secure Boot against tampering and bootkit-type attacks[5]. To check its status, Microsoft says to enter msinfo32 in a Windows command prompt[5].

Why do firmware updates matter?

Microsoft released the CVE-2023-24932 fix on May 9, 2023, but disabled by default: customers had to follow manual steps before enabling it[5]. These measures depend on device firmware, which can have flaws like any software; Microsoft has seen a few cases of firmware mishandling updates[6]. Microsoft announced that the Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate would expire in October 2026, and that a device without the new Windows UEFI CA 2023 certificate would no longer be able to receive Windows updates[6].

Inside the attacker's head

The bootkit comes at the end of the chain. The BlackLotus installer checks that it has at least administrator rights; if not, it tries to elevate by bypassing User Account Control (UAC)[4].

The product is for sale. ESET reports that BlackLotus has been advertised on underground forums since at least October 6, 2022, for 5,000 dollars[4]. ESET could not identify the distribution channel and, given the small number of samples obtained, believes few actors had started using it yet[4]. Some installers do not continue if the machine uses one of seven locales, including Russian (Russia) and Ukrainian (Ukraine)[4].

Physical access is one of the leads raised for ESPecter. ESET does not know how its operators disabled Secure Boot, but cites the scenario of an attacker who, with the device in hand (an attack historically known as "evil maid"), disables it in the BIOS setup menu[3]. For the CVE-2024-7344 flaw, dropping the malicious files requires elevated privileges: local administrator on Windows, root on Linux[7].

What you see on screen

Almost nothing, and that is deliberate. ESET explains that the BlackLotus installer disables BitLocker, because leaving it on for a computer with a TPM would trigger a BitLocker recovery screen at the next startup and alert the victim[4].

What IT may notice is protections that stop. Microsoft notes that disabling Microsoft Defender Antivirus can produce event log entries saying that antimalware protection stopped working for an unknown reason, or Service Control Manager event 7023[1]. The bootkit's files are locked: any attempt to access them returns a sharing violation error (ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION), stating that the file is being used by another process[1]. If someone manages to lift the protection and close the file handles, the driver triggers a blue screen[4]. Microsoft also considers outbound connections from winlogon.exe, especially to port 80, highly suspicious[1]. Taken alone, these clues are unreliable; their combination gives them weight[1].

Under the hoodIT teams

At startup, the UEFI firmware checks every boot application with Secure Boot: the image must be trusted by the db database and, at the same time, its hash or certificate must not appear in the dbx database of forbidden items[7]. BlackLotus bypasses this check with the CVE-2022-21894 flaw, nicknamed "Baton Drop"[1].

Microsoft had fixed it in the January 2022 update, but the affected binaries were not on the revocation list: the attacker therefore brings their own copies of these legitimate but vulnerable binaries[4]. A proof-of-concept exploit had been public since August 2022[4].

ESET describes a three-step chain. The installer drops its files in the EFI system partition (ESP), disables HVCI and BitLocker, then reboots. After the reboot, the flaw is exploited and the attacker's MOK key is enrolled. On later startups, a legitimate shim signed by Microsoft loads the self-signed bootkit[4]. The bootkit then slots into the Windows startup, neutralizes Defender drivers and injects an HTTP downloader into the winlogon.exe process, which contacts its server over HTTPS, by default every minute[4].

Revoking the vulnerable binaries is not simple. According to ESET, it may make thousands of older systems, recovery images or backups unbootable[4]. Microsoft specifies that mitigations 3 and 4, which revoke the old boot manager, make existing installation media unbootable until their boot manager is updated[6]. The schedule Microsoft announced in 2023 had three phases: May 9, 2023, July 11, 2023, then the first quarter of 2024 for enablement by default[5]. In 2025, Microsoft says it does not plan to roll these mitigations out in enterprise environments[6]. For CISA, BlackLotus exploits a failure in the secure distribution of updates: it can roll a file back to a vulnerable version, then exploit it[2].

Case filesReal cases

ESPecter, October 2021

On October 5, 2021, ESET published its analysis of a UEFI bootkit it named ESPecter[3]. It persists on the ESP as a modified Windows boot manager and bypasses driver signature enforcement to load its own unsigned driver[3]. ESET traces its roots back to 2012, as a legacy BIOS bootkit that modified the MBR[3]. On the compromised machine, it came with a component that logged keystrokes and stole documents, which leads ESET to think it is used mainly for espionage[3].

ESET could not attribute it to a known actor. Debug messages in Chinese lead it to suspect, with low confidence, an unknown Chinese-speaking actor, and the distribution of the bootkit remains unknown[3]. This method has a drawback: it requires Secure Boot to be disabled[3].

BlackLotus, March to August 2023

On March 1, 2023, ESET published the first public analysis of BlackLotus, which it presents as the first UEFI bootkit observed in the wild to bypass Secure Boot on fully up-to-date UEFI systems[4]. On April 11, 2023, Microsoft published a guide to determine whether devices are infected[1]. On May 9, 2023, Microsoft released CVE-2023-24932 and its associated configuration, to fix the Secure Boot bypass used by BlackLotus[5]. On August 3, 2023, CISA called on the UEFI community to make firmware updates more reliable and noted that Microsoft plans to automate revocation in early 2024[2].

CVE-2024-7344, January 2025

On January 16, 2025, ESET described a flaw that allows Secure Boot to be bypassed on most UEFI systems[7]. It lies in a UEFI application signed by the third-party Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 certificate, present in several system recovery software products[7]. The application uses its own PE file loader instead of the standard UEFI functions and loads, from a file named cloak.dat, any UEFI binary, even an unsigned one[7].

ESET found the flaw on July 8, 2024 and reported it to CERT/CC the next day[7]. Vendors fixed it, and Microsoft revoked the old vulnerable binaries in the January 14, 2025 update[7]. ESET states it has detected no real-world exploitation attempt in its telemetry[7]. According to ESET, the revocations should arrive automatically on Windows systems[7].

Sources

  1. Microsoft, “Guidance for investigating attacks using CVE-2022-21894: The BlackLotus campaign”, 11 April 2023. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  2. CISA, “A Call to Action: Bolster UEFI Cybersecurity Now”, 3 August 2023. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/call-action-bolster-uefi-cybersecurity-now (accessed 14 November 2026)
  3. ESET, “UEFI threats moving to the ESP: Introducing ESPecter bootkit”, 5 October 2021. https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/10/05/uefi-threats-moving-esp-introducing-especter-bootkit/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  4. ESET, “BlackLotus UEFI bootkit: Myth confirmed”, 1 March 2023. https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  5. Microsoft, “Guidance related to Secure Boot Manager changes associated with CVE-2023-24932”, 9 May 2023. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2023/05/guidance-related-to-secure-boot-manager-changes-associated-with-cve-2023-24932 (accessed 14 November 2026)
  6. Microsoft, “Enterprise Deployment Guidance for CVE-2023-24932”, 13 February 2025. https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/servicing/os/windows/2025/02/enterprise-deployment-guidance-for-cve-2023-24932 (accessed 14 November 2026)
  7. ESET, “Under the cloak of UEFI Secure Boot: Introducing CVE-2024-7344”, 16 January 2025. https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/under-cloak-uefi-secure-boot-introducing-cve-2024-7344/ (accessed 14 November 2026)