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Stuxnet, the worm for industrial controllers

How Stuxnet, discovered in 2010, crossed the isolation of an industrial network via USB stick and reprogrammed Siemens controllers.

On this page
  1. 1In 30 seconds
  2. 2What it is
  3. 3Straight answers
  4. 4Inside the attacker's head
  5. 5What you see on screen
  6. 6Under the hood
  7. 7Case files
  8. 8Sources
  9. 9Cite this article

In 30 seconds

Where it happens
On Windows workstations connected to industrial controllers. Known propagation routes include infected USB sticks, network shares, STEP 7 project files and WinCC databases[2].
What the attacker wants
To change the behavior of physical machines without operators seeing it. Stuxnet can reprogram a controller and apply inappropriate command sequences to cause physical damage[1].
The reflex
Do not plug a USB stick of unknown origin into an industrial workstation, since an early version of Stuxnet got in that way[1].

What it is

Stuxnet is the first publicly disclosed malware to have specifically targeted industrial control equipment. It was discovered in 2010, and some of its components were in use as early as November 2008[1]. It combines several unknown Windows vulnerabilities, a rootkit (a program that hides its own files) and network propagation routines[1].

Straight answers

Is a network cut off from the internet safe?

No. An early version of Stuxnet installed itself physically: an infected configuration file, carried on a USB stick, infected the target systems when opened[1]. MITRE notes that a willing employee or an unknown third party, such as a contractor, may have brought the removable media into the targeted environment[1].

What is a controller, and why target it?

A controller (PLC) drives a physical machine: a valve or a motor, for example. Stuxnet looked for Siemens controllers of type 6ES7-315-2 and for frequency converters, boxes that set the speed of a motor[1]. Reprogramming the controller makes it possible to act on the machine itself, not just on data.

Why do patches matter here?

The worm exploited flaws that Microsoft later patched. Two of the four zero-day vulnerabilities at the time of CISA's analysis already had a patch[2]. An up-to-date workstation closes routes the worm uses.

Can a workstation without Siemens software carry traces of the worm?

Yes. The worm interacts with the Siemens WinCC and STEP 7 software[2]. Some infection indicators appear on workstations whether or not this software is installed[2].

Inside the attacker's head

The attacker aims at a precise target, and the code shows it. Stuxnet checks the operating system, registry keys and dates, and stops if the expected values are missing[1]. It then looks, in a controller's system data, for a Profibus communication module of type CP 342-5, and counts frequency converter references: one matches a model made by Fararo Paya in Tehran, the other Vacon NX units made by Vacon, in Finland[1].

The worm can also last. It can update itself through a command-and-control infrastructure or through peer-to-peer exchanges using the RPC protocol[2]. It erases its traces: it can delete itself from the system and write driver files whose dates imitate those of legitimate files[1].

What you see on screen

The worm hides its action from operators. Stuxnet copies the input area of the controller's input/output image, with one second between each copy, which forms a 21-second recording. This area contains, for example, the state of a valve or the temperature of a device[1]. When a command is written to a peripheral, the worm intercepts it and prevents it from reaching the output image: an operator therefore does not notice the unauthorized commands[1]. MITRE sums up this mechanism as follows: Stuxnet manipulates the operators' view by replaying process inputs[1].

On the Windows workstation, the clues are technical. CISA cites a malicious s7otbxdx.dll file bearing the name of the legitimate STEP 7 file, which the worm renamed s7otbxsx.dll, as well as .sav files in the GraCS subfolder of a project[2].

Under the hoodIT teams

Getting in: the USB stick and Windows vulnerabilities

Stuxnet can spread through an autorun.inf file or through the shortcut vulnerability CVE-2010-2568[3]. Microsoft describes the latter: Windows parses a shortcut incorrectly, and malicious code can run when the system displays the icon of a booby-trapped shortcut file[4]. The attacker obtains the rights of the logged-in user, and if AutoPlay is disabled, the user must open the stick's folder themselves[4]. The bulletin is dated August 2, 2010[4].

Moving around: network, printing, privileges

The worm also spreads through the vulnerabilities MS10-061 (print service) and MS08-067 (Windows Server service)[5]. For MS10-061, Microsoft explains that the attack goes through a specially crafted print request, sent to a system whose print interface is exposed via RPC, and that printers are not shared by default[6]. The vulnerability is rated critical on Windows XP[6]. To gain more privileges on a workstation, Stuxnet used MS10-073 and an undisclosed Task Scheduler vulnerability[7].

Hiding: stolen certificate and rootkit

The worm used a driver digitally signed with a compromised Realtek certificate[8], and a Windows rootkit to hide its files[1].

Striking: the controller

Stuxnet replaces a library that communicates with the controller with its own version, which lets it intercept calls[1]. It infects the code blocks OB1 and OB35, the latter acting as a watchdog[1]. It sends instructions to the converters, for example to change the maximum frequency, that is, the operating speed of the motor[1]. It also uses a password hard-coded in the WinCC database to reach neighboring machines[1].

Case filesReal cases

2010: discovery and public response

In 2010, Stuxnet is discovered[1]. On August 2, 2010, Microsoft publishes a patch for the shortcut vulnerability[4], then on September 14, 2010 another for the print service[6]. CISA then describes the worm as using four unknown vulnerabilities, two of them already patched, and lists detection indicators tested on an infected Windows XP SP3[2]. It reminds readers that an impact and risk analysis should be performed before any defensive measure[2].

Other cases of control manipulation

For the same control manipulation technique, the MITRE base cites the 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid, in which the Sandworm Team group opened circuit breakers through commands sent to the operator interface, causing power outages, and the Industroyer software, which opens circuit breakers through unauthorized commands[9].

Lessons for the company

  • USB sticks: an early version of Stuxnet installed itself through an infected configuration file carried on a USB stick[1], and the shortcut vulnerability ran when an icon was displayed[4].
  • Patches: applying updates reduces entry routes. Microsoft recommends installing the print patch immediately through an update management tool[6].
  • Network separation: MITRE advises keeping backups of critical systems away from the corporate network and validating data through a separate, out-of-band channel[9]. The same text states that no standard detection method exists for this technique[9].
  • Reference: NIST publishes a security guide for industrial systems, revision 3 dating from September 2023[10].

Sources

  1. MITRE ATT&CK, “Stuxnet, Software S0603 | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  2. CISA, “Primary Stuxnet Advisory | CISA”. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-10-272-01 (accessed 10 November 2026)
  3. MITRE ATT&CK, “Replication Through Removable Media, Technique T1091 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  4. Microsoft, “Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-046 - Critical”, 2 August 2010. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2010/ms10-046 (accessed 10 November 2026)
  5. MITRE ATT&CK, “Exploitation of Remote Services, Technique T1210 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  6. Microsoft, “Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-061 - Critical”, 14 September 2010. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2010/ms10-061 (accessed 10 November 2026)
  7. MITRE ATT&CK, “Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Technique T1068 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  8. MITRE ATT&CK, “Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, Sub-technique T1553.002 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  9. MITRE ATT&CK, “Manipulation of Control, Technique T0831 - ICS | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0831/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
  10. NIST, “SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security | CSRC”, 28 September 2023. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final (accessed 10 November 2026)