Elicitation: when an ordinary chat makes you talk
An ordinary conversation can be used to extract information or credentials. The TA453 and Star Blizzard cases show how, and what to do.
On this page
In 30 seconds
- Where it happens
- By messaging, often on the personal address, from a webmail address (Outlook, Gmail, Yahoo) that uses the name of a contact or of a public figure in your field[1].
- What the attacker wants
- Your email credentials, then the contents of your mailbox and your contact list[1].
- The reflex
- Check by another means that the message is legitimate, and ask yourself whether this person would really write from this address[1].
- If it is already done
- Credentials entered on the fake login page are compromised, and it helps to check your forwarding rules regularly[1].
What it is
An ordinary conversation can be used to get information out of a person without asking a single suspicious question. In the campaigns described by the NCSC (UK), the attacker often starts with a contact that looks harmless, on a subject they hope will interest the target, and asks for nothing else for a while[1].
MITRE ATT&CK groups this family of approaches under the name "Phishing for Information": tricking the target into disclosing information, often credentials or other information that can be exploited[2]. The goal is to collect data from the victim, not to run malicious code[2].
Straight answers
What does the attacker do during the conversation?
MITRE describes adversaries who try to obtain information directly through emails, instant messages or other forms of electronic conversation[2]. In the NCSC's campaigns, the exchange is used to build trust. Once trust is established, the attacker sends a link, apparently to a document or a site of interest, which leads to a server they control and asks the target to enter their credentials[1].
Who is targeted?
For 2022, the NCSC lists higher education, defence, government organisations, NGOs, think tanks, as well as politicians, journalists and activists[1]. The actor targets a person they believe has direct access to the information they want, is a way in to another target, or both[1]. According to CISA, Star Blizzard has targeted higher education, defence, government organisations, NGOs, think tanks and politicians since 2019[3]. MITRE notes that Star Blizzard sent emails to establish contact before sending links to credential-harvesting sites[4].
How long does the exchange last before the request?
There may be a correspondence, sometimes over a long period[1]. For some TA453 subgroups, Proofpoint describes benign conversations lasting weeks before malicious links are sent, while another subgroup sends a malicious link in the very first email[6]. In Operation SpoofedScholars, TA453 ended up sending its link earlier, without a long prior conversation[5].
How can you recognise this kind of approach?
The NCSC asks four questions. Do you recognise the sender's address, and not just their name? Would you expect a message from this person from a webmail address rather than a professional one? Did the message arrive on your personal address rather than your professional one? Can you verify its legitimacy by another means[1]?
Proofpoint lists signs of a persona linked to TA453, stating that the presence of a single sign is not enough to condemn an email: a Gmail, Outlook, Hotmail or AOL address in place of an institutional address, other personal accounts in the conversation, a reply to an empty email, a proposal to collaborate on Middle East research, an offer of a Zoom call (which often leads to a credential-harvesting link), an unsolicited draft sent as an attachment[6].
What should you do?
- Use a separate password for your email and turn on two-factor authentication, which reduces the effect of a compromised password[1].
- Verify the identity of anyone offering an exceptional opportunity, especially one that takes place remotely[5].
- When approached by a journalist, check their website or their publication's website to see whether the address belongs to them[6].
- Turn off automatic mail forwarding or, failing that, check your settings regularly[1].
- In the UK, report to the NCSC any activity matching these descriptions[1].
Inside the attacker's head
The attacker first prepares their approach. They look for hooks in open sources, including social media and professional platforms, study the target's interests and identify their real contacts[1]. They create fake profiles that imitate recognised experts, use supposed conference invitations or approaches from journalists, and register domains that look like those of legitimate organisations[1]. The NCSC states that actors may choose the personal address to get around the company network's controls[1].
With TA453, Proofpoint also describes reliance on the psychological principle of social proof: several personas controlled by the actor on the same thread make the approach look more authentic[6]. The technique takes more resources per target and coordination between the personas[6]. For this type of approach, MITRE also notes the sending of several messages that seem urgent[2].
What you see on screen
- A message from a person whose name you know, or from a public figure in your sector, sent from a webmail address[1].
- An invitation to a conference or an event, or an approach from a supposed journalist[1].
- Friendly exchanges, with no suspicious request, sometimes over a long period[1].
- Several correspondents on the same thread: a second persona in copy replies the next day, which Proofpoint judges probably intended to establish the authenticity of the request[6].
- A link to a document on OneDrive, GoogleDrive or another file-sharing platform, or a link presented as a Zoom meeting[1].
- A login page that copies that of a legitimate service[1].
Under the hoodIT teams
When the target clicks, they land on an attacker's server that imitates the login page of a legitimate service, and any credentials entered are compromised[1]. According to CISA, Star Blizzard uses the open-source framework EvilGinx to capture credentials and session cookies, which bypasses two-factor authentication[3]. MITRE describes the same principle: the victim is redirected to the real site while the adversary captures their session cookie[4].
The actor then logs in to the mailbox, reads and copies emails and attachments, and has set up forwarding rules to follow the victim's correspondence[1]. According to CISA, these rules maintain access even after credentials are reset[3]. The actor has also used the contact list to find new targets, and compromised accounts for further phishing[1].
Proofpoint notes other variants. In SpoofedScholars, the link led to a harvesting page hosted on a legitimate but compromised site, which offered login with several email providers and pre-filled the target's address for some of them[5]. In 2022, Proofpoint observed an attempt to send an empty email followed by a reply with all the personas in copy, probably to evade detection[6].
Case filesReal cases
Operation SpoofedScholars (Proofpoint, 13 July 2021)
Posing as British academics from SOAS (University of London), TA453 had been quietly approaching people since at least January 2021 to obtain sensitive information[5]. The targets identified were Middle East specialists at think tanks, professors and journalists[5]. In the detailed example, a fake academic proposes an online conference. They try to reach the target by phone, then give way when the target demands a written proposal, and finally ask for a video call[5]. The emails were benign up to the link to a compromised site hosting a credential-harvesting page[5]. Proofpoint writes that academics, journalists and think tank members should verify the identity of those who offer them unique opportunities[5].
TA453 and multiple personas (Proofpoint, 13 September 2022)
From June 2022, TA453 used what Proofpoint calls multi-persona impersonation: at least two personas on the same thread[6]. In a first campaign, the opening persona asks questions about Israel, the Gulf states and the Abraham Accords, and copies in a second persona, who replies the next day[6]. In another, a target who is a genome research specialist receives a message with two other actor accounts in copy, then a OneDrive link to a malicious Word document[6]. In a third case, the target stops replying for a little over a week; the persona then sends them a OneDrive link, and four days later another persona removes the first from the thread, apologises and sends the same link again[6].
SEABORGIUM, TA453 and Star Blizzard (NCSC, 26 January 2023; CISA, 7 December 2023)
In January 2023 the NCSC writes that SEABORGIUM (Russia) and TA453 (Iran) continue to use spear-phishing successfully to collect information, that their campaigns are separate and that they do not collaborate[1]. The NCSC cites a case where TA453 held a Zoom call with the target in order to slip the malicious link into the chat[1]. In December 2023, CISA publishes an advisory on Star Blizzard, the current name of SEABORGIUM[3]. The signatory agencies assess Star Blizzard to be almost certainly subordinate to Centre 18 of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)[3]. CISA states that in 2022 its activity appears to have expanded to targets in the defence industry and to US Department of Energy facilities[3].
Sources
- NCSC (UK), “SEABORGIUM and TA453 continue their respective spear-phishing campaigns against targets of interest”, 26 January 2023. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/spear-phishing-campaigns-targets-of-interest (accessed 14 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Phishing for Information, Technique T1598 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
- CISA, “Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spearphishing Campaigns”, 7 December 2023. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-341a (accessed 14 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link, Sub-technique T1598.003 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/003/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
- Proofpoint, “Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453”, 13 July 2021. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/operation-spoofedscholars-conversation-ta453 (accessed 14 November 2026)
- Proofpoint, “Look What You Made Me Do: TA453 Uses Multi-Persona Impersonation to Capitalize on FOMO”, 13 September 2022. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta453-uses-multi-persona-impersonation-capitalize-fomo (accessed 14 November 2026)
Cite this article
Brain, “Elicitation: when an ordinary chat makes you talk”, Cyberpedia, 2026. https:/
BibTeX
@misc{brain_cp030_en_2026,
author = {Brain},
title = {Elicitation: when an ordinary chat makes you talk},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {Cyberpedia},
url = {https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/elicitation-extracting-information-conversation/},
note = {CC BY 4.0}
}