Colonial Pipeline: remote access and MFA
The May 2021 attack on Colonial Pipeline: what the victim sees, how DarkSide ransomware works, and what MFA changes.
On this page
In 30 seconds
- Where it happens
- On remotely accessible accounts and systems and on a company's virtual desktop infrastructure, which the CISA advisory lists among DarkSide's initial access methods[2].
- What the attacker wants
- To encrypt systems, steal data, then threaten to publish it if the ransom is not paid[2].
- The reflex
- Follow the organization's approved incident response plan, and require multi-factor authentication (MFA) on every VPN connection[3].
- If it has already happened
- Isolate the infected system from all networks[2].
What it is
On May 7, 2021, a ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline made headlines around the world, with lines of cars at gas stations on the US East Coast[1]. CISA and the FBI stated that DarkSide ransomware had been deployed against the company's IT network[2].
DarkSide has been observed gaining initial access through phishing and the exploitation of accounts and systems reachable from outside, and CISA recommends measures against these routes[2].
Straight answers
What happened at Colonial Pipeline?
On May 7, 2021, ransomware hit the company[1]. CISA and the FBI describe a DarkSide attack on the IT network of a pipeline company[2]. The company said it had proactively disconnected some operational technology (OT) systems to secure them[2]. At the time of the advisory, nothing indicated that the OT networks had been directly affected or that the attackers had moved into them[2].
Is a single VPN account enough to get into a network?
Remote access services such as VPNs let people connect to internal resources from outside, and a valid account is often needed to use them[4]. These credentials can be obtained from users or after the network has been compromised[4].
Why is a forgotten account a risk?
Compromised credentials can bypass access controls and give lasting access to VPNs, web mail or remote desktop[5]. MITRE notes that inactive accounts, for example those of people who have left the organization, can be used to avoid detection: the account holder is no longer there to notice unusual activity[5].
What does ransomware do to the machines?
It encrypts files on local and remote drives and withholds the decryption key[6]. Files are often renamed or marked[6]. Some ransomware spreads like a worm across the network by relying on valid accounts[6].
What does multi-factor authentication change?
It asks for at least two proofs of identity: something you know (password, PIN), something you have (physical token, authenticator app) or something you are (a body characteristic)[7]. MITRE recommends requiring it first for remote access, privileged accounts and cloud applications[7]. CISA asks for it to be enabled on all VPN connections and, failing that, for remote workers to be required to use passwords of 15 characters or more[3]. In its DarkSide advisory, it also asks for MFA on remote access to OT and IT networks[2].
What changes when data is stolen before it is encrypted?
CISA calls the combination of encryption and the threat to publish stolen data "double extortion"[3]. To get data out, an attacker can use a legitimate web service: machines on the network already communicate with it, and firewall rules sometimes allow it[8].
What should you do when facing a ransom message or a locked computer?
CISA and the FBI recommend isolating the infected system from all networks, powering off other devices that shared the network and are not yet encrypted, and securing offline backups[2]. They advise against paying, because it may encourage further attacks and does not guarantee that files will be recovered[2]. The advisory asks that the incident be reported to CISA or the FBI without delay[2]. For an organization, CISA asks to follow its approved incident response plan[3].
Inside the attacker's head
DarkSide operates as "ransomware-as-a-service": the developers receive a share of the gains made by the affiliates who deploy the ransomware[2]. Since August 2020, the group had been targeting large, high-revenue organizations, with encryption and theft of sensitive data[2]. It said it preferred companies able to pay large ransoms over hospitals, schools, nonprofits and governments[2].
To get in, an affiliate can use phishing, the exploitation of exposed applications or remote access services, including accounts and systems reachable from outside and virtual desktop infrastructure[2]. An attacker who holds valid credentials can even do without malicious software, which makes his presence harder to spot[5]. He can then keep that access as a fallback route during the operation[4]. DarkSide has also been seen using the RDP protocol to establish a lasting foothold[2].
Once inside the network, affiliates deploy the ransomware to encrypt and steal data, then threaten to publish it[2]. To control their tools remotely, they mostly go through the Tor network, and have also been observed with Cobalt Strike[2].
What you see on screen
At first, the attacker's presence can remain hard to spot: with a valid account, he can forgo the malware and the tools that would give him away[5]. If the account belongs to someone who is no longer in the organization, the account holder is no longer there to notice unusual activity[5].
Then comes the effect of encryption: everyday files (Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, source code) become unreadable, sometimes renamed or marked[6]. Ransom notes may appear, and the ransomware may change the wallpaper or send messages to connected printers, which MITRE calls "print bombing"[6].
Invented illustration, unrelated to any real case.
[Typical ransom note: your files are encrypted; a ransom is demanded;
stolen data will be published if nothing is paid.]A computer in this state is handled as in the answer "What should you do when facing a ransom message" above: isolated, then reported.
Under the hoodIT teams
The path breaks down into techniques that the MITRE ATT&CK framework numbers. Access through a remote service (T1133) belongs to initial access and persistence, and covers VPN, Citrix and other access mechanisms[4]. Valid accounts (T1078) serve initial access, persistence, privilege escalation and evasion[5]. Encryption for impact (T1486) targets the availability of systems[6]. Exfiltration over a web service (T1567) sends data out through a legitimate service rather than through the main command channel[8].
On the DarkSide side, CISA states that the ransomware uses the Salsa20 and RSA algorithms[2]. For a variant analyzed later, it notes that it deletes volume shadow copies, collects and encrypts system information and generates a ransom note, while specifying that it has no evidence that the variant is linked to the pipeline incident[2].
Against initial access, MITRE proposes MFA applied to all critical accounts, including through third-party tools on older systems, with alerts on suspicious attempts such as repeated wrong codes or the registration of a new device[7]. CISA adds segmentation between IT and OT networks, tested backups isolated from the network, and accounts limited by least privilege[2].
Case filesReal cases
May 7, 2021: Colonial Pipeline
On May 7, 2021, the attack on Colonial Pipeline triggered lines of cars at gas stations on the East Coast[1]. On May 11, 2021, CISA and the FBI published a first advisory: DarkSide deployed its ransomware against the company's IT network, and the company for its part disconnected some OT systems as a precaution[2].
Two years later, CISA takes stock. It created the stopransomware.gov site, launched the Joint Ransomware Task Force with the FBI and set up the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative[1]. With the TSA, it brought together more than 25 large pipeline operators to strengthen the security of their OT networks[1]. It also writes that attacks cannot be prevented completely, but that their impact can be reduced through resilience[1].
2025: wiper attacks in Poland
MITRE cites the "2025 Poland Wiper Attacks" as an example of access through a remote service: the attackers used the FortiGate VPN interface exposed to the Internet to get into the victims' networks[4]. The same framework indicates that the Akira group uses compromised VPN accounts for initial access[4]. These two cases involve an entry point of the same family as the one in the DarkSide advisory: remote access[2][4].
Sources
- CISA, “The Attack on Colonial Pipeline: What We’ve Learned & What We’ve Done Over the Past Two Years”, 7 May 2023. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/attack-colonial-pipeline-what-weve-learned-what-weve-done-over-past-two-years (accessed 10 November 2026)
- CISA, “DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks”, 11 May 2021. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (accessed 10 November 2026)
- CISA, “#StopRansomware Guide”. https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide (accessed 10 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “External Remote Services, Technique T1133 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Valid Accounts, Technique T1078 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Data Encrypted for Impact, Technique T1486 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Multi-factor Authentication, Mitigation M1032 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1032/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Exfiltration Over Web Service, Technique T1567 - Enterprise”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
Cite this article
Brain, “Colonial Pipeline: remote access and MFA”, Cyberpedia, 2026. https:/
BibTeX
@misc{brain_cp172_en_2026,
author = {Brain},
title = {Colonial Pipeline: remote access and MFA},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {Cyberpedia},
url = {https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/colonial-pipeline-ransomware-autopsy/},
note = {CC BY 4.0}
}