Password spraying: one common password on every account
Password spraying tries one common password on many accounts to stay under lockout limits. Real cases and what employees can do.
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- Where it happens
- On services reachable from the internet, such as web mail, remote desktop access or cloud services[2]. MITRE also lists single sign-on (SSO) applications and exposed email, for example Office 365[1].
- What the attacker wants
- A single valid account. In November 2023, a test account without multifactor authentication was enough to reach the mailboxes of Microsoft executives[3][4].
- The reflex
- Choose a long password that is not among the most common ones, turn on multifactor authentication, and report any sign-in alert you did not cause[5][4].
- If it has already happened
- Microsoft recommends resetting the passwords of accounts targeted by this kind of attack[4].
What it is
Password spraying reverses the logic of classic brute force. Instead of trying many passwords on a single account, the attacker tries one common password, or a short list, on many accounts. This avoids the account lockouts that a series of failures on one account would cause[1].
The Australian Cyber Security Centre describes the principle this way: the attacker uses one password against the targeted accounts, then moves on to a second password, and so on. This lets the attacker stay quiet by avoiding rapid or frequent lockouts[2].
Straight answers
Why is a single weak account enough?
Because a valid account gives real access to the network or to email. In 2018, Russian SVR actors used password spraying to find the weak password of an administrator account. The organization had mistakenly exempted that account from the multifactor authentication requirement. With that account, the attackers changed the permissions of some mailboxes[6]. In Microsoft's case, the attacker went through an old test account to access a very small percentage of the company's email accounts[3].
Why does account lockout not stop this attack?
Lockout counts failures per account. With only one attempt per account, the threshold is never reached[1]. Attackers can also deliberately slow down their attempts. MITRE cites APT28, with about four attempts per hour per account over several days or weeks, and activity that tried only one login per 24-hour period[1]. MITRE adds that an overly strict lockout policy can create a denial of service, because all the targeted accounts end up locked[1].
Which passwords are tried?
Common passwords, which may even meet the domain's complexity policy[1]. CISA gives "Spring2024" and "Password123!" as examples to avoid[5]. A complexity rule therefore does not, on its own, protect against a predictable password.
What can an employee do?
- Choose a long password. CISA recommends creating a non-standard password of 8 to 64 characters and, where possible, long passphrases[5].
- Turn on multifactor authentication wherever it is offered. MITRE lists it among the mitigations against this technique[1].
- Review the sign-in activity of your account and flag suspicious attempts with the "This wasn’t me" option, which Microsoft advises teaching to users[4].
- Refuse multifactor authentication requests you did not trigger[5].
Inside the attacker's head
The attacker starts by gathering names and email addresses. CISA notes that Iranian actors probably carried out a reconnaissance phase to collect identity information about their victims[5]. The Silent Librarian group, cited by MITRE, used lists of collected names and addresses to carry out its attacks against private-sector targets[1].
The tools are easy to get. The Iranian actors described by CISA imported DomainPasswordSpray.ps1, a tool freely available on GitHub[5]. MITRE also cites MailSniper, which can be used against Exchange and Office 365[1].
The goal varies. Midnight Blizzard, a Russian state-backed actor, was seeking to collect intelligence[4]. The Iranian actors were probably after credentials and information about the victims' networks, which were then sold on to cybercriminals[5].
What you see on screen
A successful attack is not always visible on screen. In some cases, when multifactor authentication relies on phone notifications, the Iranian actors send requests to legitimate users hoping one will be accepted. This technique, called "MFA fatigue" or "push bombing", bombards the user with notifications until they approve one by accident or stop receiving them[5]. CISA recommends teaching users to refuse requests they did not generate[5].
Microsoft also advises teaching users to review the sign-in activity of their account[4]. An "Unfamiliar sign-in properties" alert, for example, flags sign-ins from networks, devices or locations that are unusual for the user[4].
On the security team's side, the attack shows up in the logs. CISA recommends looking for multiple authentication failures across all accounts[5]. MITRE describes the same signature: a large number of login failures with a single password, or a small number of passwords, across many different accounts within a given time window[1].
Under the hoodIT teams
The targeted services are often administration services on common ports: SSH, FTP, SMB, LDAP, Kerberos, RDP, as well as web services[1]. To get under detection thresholds, attackers may slow down their attempts. They may also go through LDAP and Kerberos, which less often trigger the Windows failed-logon event 4625 than failed SMB logins do[1].
Attackers also hide where they come from. Midnight Blizzard used a network of residential proxies, which routes traffic through a very large number of IP addresses also used by legitimate users. Microsoft states that this makes detection based on traditional indicators such as IP addresses impossible, because those addresses turn over quickly[4]. The SVR's 2018 operations used many addresses from the same country as the victim, residential, commercial, mobile and TOR[6].
To detect these attacks, CISA advises looking for impossible logins, one IP address used for several accounts, and impossible travel, meaning sign-ins from locations too far apart in too short a time. This last detection can produce false positives if legitimate users go through a VPN[5]. Microsoft Entra ID Protection offers a "Password spray" alert, which fires when an attack of this type has succeeded[4].
On the defense side, MITRE cites multifactor authentication, including on exposed services, account lockout policies, conditional access and passwords that follow NIST recommendations[1].
Case filesReal cases
Midnight Blizzard against Microsoft, November 2023
Microsoft detected a nation-state attack on its internal systems on 12 January 2024[3]. According to Microsoft, the actor, Midnight Blizzard (also known as Nobelium), is backed by the Russian state. It began in late November 2023 with a password spray attack against an account on a legacy, non-production test tenant. It then used the permissions of that account to access a very small percentage of the company's email accounts, including those of members of senior leadership and of cybersecurity and legal staff, and to exfiltrate emails and attachments[3].
Microsoft states that the attack did not come from a vulnerability in its products, and that to date there is no evidence of access to customer environments, production systems, source code or AI systems[3]. The initial account did not have multifactor authentication enabled[4]. The actor had limited its attempts to a few accounts and a few tries to avoid lockouts based on the number of failures[4]. According to Microsoft, if the same team deployed that legacy tenant today, the company's mandatory rules would require multifactor authentication[4].
Iranian actors against critical infrastructure, since October 2023
In an advisory published on 16 October 2024, the FBI, CISA, the NSA and their Canadian and Australian partners describe Iranian actors active since October 2023. They used brute force, including password spraying, and push bombing to compromise accounts in the healthcare, government, information technology, engineering and energy sectors[5]. The actors often modified multifactor authentication registrations to keep lasting access[5]. In two confirmed compromises, they took advantage of the open registration of a compromised user to enroll their own device[5].
The Russian SVR, April 2021 advisory
A CISA advisory revised on 26 April 2021 describes a 2018 compromise of a large network. SVR actors carried out "low and slow" password spraying (few passwords, at spaced intervals), possibly to avoid detection, and found the weak password of an administrator account[6]. Once inside the accounts, they generally used them from a single IP address, that of a leased virtual private server[6]. The FBI and DHS recommend, among other things, mandatory multifactor authentication for all users and, where possible, technically enforced bans on easily guessable or common passwords, especially for administration accounts[6].
Sources
- MITRE ATT&CK, “Brute Force: Password Spraying, Sub-technique T1110.003 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®”. https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
- CISA, “ACSC Releases Advisory on Password Spraying Attacks | CISA”. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2019/08/08/acsc-releases-advisory-password-spraying-attacks (accessed 14 November 2026)
- Microsoft, “Microsoft Actions Following Attack by Nation State Actor Midnight Blizzard”, 19 January 2024. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2024/01/microsoft-actions-following-attack-by-nation-state-actor-midnight-blizzard (accessed 14 November 2026)
- Microsoft, “Midnight Blizzard: Guidance for responders on nation-state attack”, 25 January 2024. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/25/midnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
- CISA, “Iranian Cyber Actors’ Brute Force and Credential Access Activity Compromises Critical Infrastructure Organizations | CISA”, 16 October 2024. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-290a (accessed 14 November 2026)
- CISA, “Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Cyber Operations: Trends and Best Practices for Network Defenders | CISA”, 26 April 2021. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-116a (accessed 14 November 2026)
Cite this article
Brain, “Password spraying: one common password on every account”, Cyberpedia, 2026. https:/
BibTeX
@misc{brain_cp037_en_2026,
author = {Brain},
title = {Password spraying: one common password on every account},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {Cyberpedia},
url = {https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/password-spraying-one-password-many-accounts/},
note = {CC BY 4.0}
}