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Fake recruiter and trojanized coding test

A fake recruiter contacts you on LinkedIn and asks you to run a coding test on your work computer: the scenario, real cases and the reflex.

On this page
  1. 1In 30 seconds
  2. 2What it is
  3. 3Straight answers
  4. 4Inside the attacker's head
  5. 5What you see on screen
  6. 6Under the hood
  7. 7Case files
  8. 8Sources
  9. 9Cite this article

In 30 seconds

Where it happens
On LinkedIn, where a fake recruiter sends programming exercises presented as a hiring step, for example to employees of a Spanish aerospace company[3].
What the attacker wants
To steal cryptocurrency wallets and credentials saved in browsers and password managers[4], or to carry out espionage[3].
The reflex
Do not run on your work computer anything a recruiter sends you (a project, a file, a command to copy and paste). Microsoft recommends a dedicated, isolated environment for any technical test[5].
If it is already done
If a compromise is suspected, Microsoft recommends isolating the device and rotating the credentials and tokens that may have been exposed[5].

What it is

A recruiter writes to you on a professional network, the offer is attractive, and the hiring process looks serious. At the coding test stage, you are asked to download a project or a file and run it on your computer. That test installs spyware.

MITRE ATT&CK probably attributes Operation Dream Job to Lazarus. The operation used fake job offers against the defense and aerospace sectors, among others[1]. The name Lazarus is often used as a catch-all term for several North Korean operators[2].

Straight answers

A recruiter asks me to run a test on my work computer: what should I do?

Do not run it on that computer. Microsoft recommends using a dedicated, isolated environment (for example a non-persistent virtual machine) and not using a primary workstation that has access to production credentials, internal repositories or privileged cloud sessions[5]. Microsoft also recommends reviewing any repository supplied by a recruiter before running scripts, installing dependencies or launching tasks, and treating copy-and-paste commands and quick troubleshooting instructions as very risky[5].

Can a very simple exercise be trapped?

Yes. In the Spanish case, the two exercises were a program that prints "Hello, World!" and a program that prints a Fibonacci sequence. Once the output was displayed, both executables installed other programs on the victim's system[3].

Which signs should raise an alarm?

Microsoft lists short links that redirect to file hosting services, newly created repositories or accounts, unusually complex steps for preparing the assessment, and instructions that ask you to disable security controls or to trust unknown repository authors[5]. A profile that looks established, with many connections, is not enough to be reassuring: ESET observed attackers who copy the profiles of real people and others who use profiles that look established, sometimes possibly compromised accounts of real people[4].

Who is behind these attacks?

MITRE ATT&CK describes Dream Job as an operation probably carried out by Lazarus[1]. ESET ties the attack on the Spanish company to Lazarus with high confidence[3]. For DeceptiveDevelopment, ESET describes a set of activities aligned with North Korea, which it does not attribute to any known actor[4].

Inside the attacker's head

The attacker chooses their targets. In Dream Job, Lazarus carried out extensive research on its targets, used LinkedIn to identify employees of a chosen organization, then targeted specific people with tailored job offers[1].

Next, they build a credible persona. According to ESET, the DeceptiveDevelopment operators copy the profiles of existing people or create new personas, then approach their targets directly on job and freelance platforms, or post fake job ads there[4]. For UNC2970, Mandiant (Google) describes polished LinkedIn accounts modeled on real users, used to build trust and encourage conversation[6].

The goals vary. In the attack on the Spanish company, the final goal was espionage[3]. DeceptiveDevelopment mostly aims at cryptocurrency theft, with possible espionage as a secondary goal[4]. Contagious Interview harvests API tokens, cloud credentials and signing keys from developer workstations that give access to source code and production infrastructure[5].

What you see on screen

A message from a recruiter, first. In the Spanish case, the attacker posed as a Meta recruiter and wrote through LinkedIn messaging[3]. With UNC2970, the conversation moves from LinkedIn to WhatsApp, where the victim then receives a document presented as a job description[6].

Then, an exercise to run. Several forms exist:

  • An executable delivered in an ISO image hosted on a third-party storage platform, with the instruction to understand the program and rewrite it in C++[3].
  • A software project hosted on GitHub, GitLab or Bitbucket. The victim must add a function or fix a bug, then build and run the project to test it[4]. The repository is often private: the victim is asked for their account ID or email address to be given access[4].
  • An NPM package to clone and run, offered by a fake recruiter from a cryptocurrency trading firm or an artificial intelligence solutions provider[5]. If the victim opens the package in Visual Studio Code, the editor asks them to trust the repository author. If they accept, Visual Studio Code automatically runs the repository's task configuration file, which loads the backdoor[5].
  • A video interview, with a link to a site that imitates a conferencing platform and offers to download its software. The software contains the first stage of the malware[4].
  • A fake interview or screening site that displays a fake technical error and asks you to copy and paste a command to fix it[5].
  • A ZIP file presented as a skills test for a job application. It contains an ISO image with a trojanized version of TightVNC, named after the company where the victim thought they were taking the test[6].

Nothing gives the trap away. ESET describes malicious code added on a single line after a long comment, which pushes it off screen unless the victim scrolls the file or turns on word wrap in their editor[4].

Under the hoodIT teams

In the Spanish case, the test executables installed a downloader named NickelLoader, which can load any program into memory, then two remote access trojans, including LightlessCan, which ESET discovered[3]. LightlessCan reproduces several Windows commands (ping, ipconfig, systeminfo, net) internally so that they do not visibly run in the console, which makes it stealthier against real-time monitoring tools (EDR) and post-incident analysis[3].

For DeceptiveDevelopment, the first link is BeaverTail. It extracts the browser databases that contain saved credentials and downloads InvisibleFerret, a modular Python program with spying and backdoor components, which can also download the legitimate software AnyDesk for the rest of the intrusion[4].

For Contagious Interview on Windows, Microsoft describes a script launched by the beaconing agent (a backdoor) that lists sensitive files (keys, environment files, passwords, wallet seed phrases) and sends them to the attackers through HTTP POST requests[5]. With UNC2970, the trojanized TightVNC sends a signal to its server as soon as the user launches the program, with no other action from them[6].

Case filesReal cases

Operation Dream Job, from September 2019 to August 2020

MITRE ATT&CK dates the first activity to September 2019 and the last to August 2020[1]. The attackers created fake LinkedIn accounts and fake email addresses to correspond with their targets, posed as human resources managers and conducted interviews to push victims into downloading malware[1]. They also sent emails with malicious attachments and OneDrive links to fake job offers[1]. In at least one case, they tried to cash in on their network access through business email compromise (BEC)[1].

UNC2970 campaign, described by Mandiant on March 9, 2023

Mandiant has tracked since June 2022 a campaign against Western media and technology companies, attributed to an espionage group suspected of being North Korean[6]. In at least one case, the attacker kept exchanging messages with the victim after the trojanized payload was run and detected, asking for screenshots of the detection[6].

Spanish aerospace company, described by ESET on September 29, 2023

A fake Meta recruiter contacted the victim on LinkedIn and sent them two programming exercises, which the victim downloaded and ran on a company device[3]. According to ESET, initial access to the network was obtained the year before its publication[3]. ESET was able to reconstruct the first stages thanks to the cooperation of the affected company[3].

DeceptiveDevelopment, described by ESET on February 20, 2025

ESET has observed, since early 2024, operators posing as headhunters and supplying software projects that hide an information-stealing program[4]. The activity has been ongoing since November 2023 at least[4]. ESET observed hundreds of victims worldwide, on Windows, Linux and macOS, ranging from junior developers to highly experienced professionals[4]. ESET reported the malicious code it observed to the relevant services[4].

Contagious Interview, described by Microsoft on March 11, 2026

Microsoft describes a campaign active since December 2022 at least, and says it still detects the activity in recent customer environments, which target developers at enterprise solution providers and at media and communications companies[5]. In recent intrusions, the attackers adapted their technique to Visual Studio Code workflows[5]. The most observed backdoor, OtterCookie, was first seen in September 2024[5].

Sources

  1. MITRE ATT&CK, “Operation Dream Job”. https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0022/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  2. MITRE ATT&CK, “Lazarus Group”. https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  3. ESET, “Lazarus luring employees with trojanized coding challenges: The case of a Spanish aerospace company”, 29 September 2023. https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  4. ESET, “DeceptiveDevelopment targets freelance developers”, 20 February 2025. https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/deceptivedevelopment-targets-freelance-developers/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  5. Microsoft, “Contagious Interview: Malware delivered through fake developer job interviews”, 11 March 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/11/contagious-interview-malware-delivered-through-fake-developer-job-interviews/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  6. Google, “Stealing the LIGHTSHOW (Part One) - North Korea's UNC2970”, 9 March 2023. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/lightshow-north-korea-unc2970/ (accessed 14 November 2026)