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Urgent end-of-week orders: always verify twice

An urgent, confidential payment order from an absent executive: why and how two people should verify it before anyone pays.

On this page
  1. 1In 30 seconds
  2. 2What it is
  3. 3Straight answers
  4. 4How it works
  5. 5What you do
  6. 6Pitfalls
  7. 7Real cases
  8. 8Sources
  9. 9Cite this article

In 30 seconds

Where it happens
Through electronic messages or by phone, or both[1].
What the attacker wants
To get money paid into a bank account held by cybercriminals, often located abroad[1].
The reflex
Call the requester back on a number you already had, never the one in the message[2], then, depending on defined thresholds or criteria, have a second person approve the order[3].
If it is already done
Tell your manager, the accounting department and the bank immediately[1].

What it is

A message from management asks for a payment right away, and asks you not to tell anyone. This scenario has a name: the fake transfer order scam (known in French as FOVI). Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr describes it as a scam that uses persuasion, threats or various kinds of pressure to get the victim to make an unplanned transfer of funds[1]. It affects every type of organization[1].

This article explains why an urgent payment order is never carried out alone. In a 2015 alert, CISA states that in most cases, fraudsters who have compromised a mailbox study the company's exchanges and travel before sending their instructions[3]. The article describes how the fraud works, then the double check: call the requester back on a known number and have a second person approve the order.

Straight answers

An executive asks me for an urgent, confidential payment: can I carry it out?

Not alone. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr notes that this type of request is sometimes presented as coming from an executive with an urgent and confidential character, which gives the President scam[1]. The CNIL describes an urgent request, supposedly approved at the top, that pushes an employee to pay without delay[2]. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr recommends an internal procedure of verification and hierarchical approval, with no exceptions allowed, for unplanned transfer requests[1].

Why not use the number given in the message?

Because it may belong to the attacker. The CNIL recommends contacting the company's known contacts by phone or in person, not by using the details in the email received[2]. To check a change in a supplier's payment details, CISA states that the number should not come from the electronic communication but from a list of that supplier's known contacts[3].

What does a second person change?

A second person prevents a single employee, under pressure, from deciding alone. CISA recommends requiring dual approval for any transfer above a set amount, involving a new business partner, new bank details for an existing partner, or a country outside the company's usual pattern[3].

Do the weekend or the absence of management make the risk worse?

For fake transfer orders, this link is not established. A 2021 FBI and CISA alert urges organizations to protect themselves during holidays and weekends, when offices are normally closed, and notes that malicious actors launched serious ransomware attacks during such days in 2021[4]. That alert is about ransomware, not fake transfers[4]. For fake orders, CISA states that in most cases, attackers who have compromised a mailbox study the company's exchanges and travel before sending their instructions[3]. The CNIL adds that procedures must follow the real organization of work, for example when an executive changes, and be recalled regularly[2].

How it works

The request relies on three levers: urgency, confidentiality and the authority of an executive. The first two appear in the phrase urgent and confidential[1], the third in the supposed approval at the top[2]. The urgency and credibility of the request can lead an employee to pay[2].

Credibility is prepared. According to the CNIL, the attacker starts by analyzing the company: job offers and organization charts, often online, show who works in which department and how the chain of decision is organized[2]. The attacker then creates a domain name close to that of the company, a supplier or an administration, by typosquatting (one character changed) or by changing the extension[2]. Finally, the attacker sends a targeted phishing email, fed with precise information about a payment or an order in progress[2].

The request takes several forms:

  • the urgent order attributed to an executive[2];
  • the change of a supplier's bank details[1][2];
  • the fake invoice to be paid into the scammers' account[2];
  • the impersonation of an employee who asks for their salary to be paid into another account[1].

The message may also come from a genuine internal address. In some cases, the fraud follows the hacking of the mailbox of the person being impersonated[1]. CISA describes the most common case: the mailbox of the chief executive or finance director is compromised to write to an employee who can make transfers[3]. When the attacker uses a spoofed address, the difference from the legitimate address is very subtle and can easily go unnoticed[3].

What you do

  • Do not pay an unplanned, urgent or confidential order alone. Have it approved through the internal hierarchical approval procedure[1]; dual approval by a second person applies depending on defined thresholds or criteria[3].
  • Call the requester back on a number from your contact list, or see them in person[2]. CISA recommends keeping this list, preferably, in a non-electronic form[3].
  • Check the sender's domain name: do the name and extension match the company's official site[2]?
  • Treat any request to change bank details the same way, before accepting the new account[1][3].
  • If your bank contacts you to verify a transfer, CISA states to delay the operation until further checks are made[3].
  • At the slightest doubt, before any transfer, call the head office of the company named on the invoice, not the number supplied by the attacker[2].

If the payment has already gone out, Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr advises listing all transfers to the fraudulent details, informing management and the accounting department, alerting the bank to ask for the funds to be returned, keeping the evidence (messages, numbers, transfer orders) and filing a complaint as soon as possible[1]. If the transfer has not yet been executed, contact accounting immediately to suspend it[1].

Pitfalls

  • The harmless opener. According to Microsoft, messages such as "Are you at your desk?" accounted for 82% of business contact impersonation attacks in July and August 2026: the attacker establishes contact before introducing the fraudulent request[6]. A question about your availability from an executive may come before the payment request.
  • Requests aimed at payroll and accounting. Again according to Microsoft, payroll update requests were the most common financial lure (6% of attacks in July and August, 7% in September), and invoice payment requests rose by 89% in September[6].
  • The fake discussion thread. In the campaign described below, an email "forwarded" between two executives contained a phrase like "no need to copy me" and headers that did not look like those of a genuine forward[5].
  • The domain name that looks right. It is not enough when a colleague's mailbox has been hacked[2]. The phone call-back therefore remains the check that counts.
  • Habit. The CNIL stresses that rules must be written down so that everyone can correct their practices[2].

Real cases

August 2026: more than a million fake executive messages

Between August 3 and 5, 2026, Microsoft detected a campaign of more than a million emails targeting enterprise users, 87.7% of them in the United States[5]. The attacker impersonated chief executives, finance directors or presidents of several targeted companies, to convince their accounts payable departments to process an ACH payment of nearly $50,000[5]. The executive's name appeared in the sender display name, the reply-to display name and the signature[5].

To make the message more credible, it contained an exchange "forwarded" between the impersonated executive and ServiceNow, along with a fake invoice on that company's letterhead[5]. Microsoft found no evidence that ServiceNow was compromised or involved[5]. The invoice asked for a transfer to accounts controlled by the attacker, at several financial institutions depending on the samples[5]. A domain imitating ServiceNow had been registered on July 31, shortly before the campaign[5].

Microsoft notes visible inconsistencies: headers were missing from the "forwarded" discussion, the earlier messages were left aligned instead of being grouped, and the executive asked not to be copied while the invoice was sent from his address[5]. Microsoft also observes indicators consistent with generative AI in the creation of the message templates, without being able to establish how far it produced the content[5].

Sources

  1. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr, “La fraude au virement bancaire (FOVI) ou au faux ordre de virement”, 27 January 2021. https://www.cybermalveillance.gouv.fr/tous-nos-contenus/fiches-reflexes/escroquerie-faux-ordres-virement-fovi (accessed 14 November 2026)
  2. CNIL, “Le faux ordre de virement international ou « fraude au président »”, 9 April 2021. https://www.cnil.fr/fr/le-faux-ordre-de-virement-international-ou-fraude-au-president (accessed 14 November 2026)
  3. CISA, “Business Email Compromise Continues to Swindle and Defraud U.S. Businesses”. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2015/06/24/business-email-compromise-continues-swindle-and-defraud-us-businesses (accessed 14 November 2026)
  4. CISA, “FBI-CISA Advisory on Ransomware Awareness for Holidays and Weekends”. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/08/31/fbi-cisa-advisory-ransomware-awareness-holidays-and-weekends (accessed 14 November 2026)
  5. Microsoft, “Protecting organizations from AI-assisted executive impersonation and invoice fraud”, 10 September 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/10/protecting-organizations-ai-assisted-executive-impersonation-invoice-fraud/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  6. Microsoft, “Email threat landscape: Q3 2026 trends and insights”, 5 November 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/05/email-threat-landscape-q3-2026-trends-and-insights/ (accessed 14 November 2026)