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Data poisoning of AI systems

How an attacker skews an AI's answers through its training, its documents or its memory, with three dated cases and the right reflexes.

On this page
  1. 1In 30 seconds
  2. 2What it is
  3. 3Straight answers
  4. 4Inside the attacker's head
  5. 5What you see on screen
  6. 6Under the hood
  7. 7Case files
  8. 8Sources
  9. 9Cite this article

In 30 seconds

Where it happens
In a model's training, in a document base the AI consults (RAG) or in an assistant's memory[1][3][4].
What the attacker wants
To make the AI produce an answer chosen in advance. In the case Microsoft observed, companies wanted their name to be recommended first[4].
The reflex
Cross-check any important answer against a reliable source, and do not add unknown documents to an internal base.
If it has already happened
Open the assistant's saved memories and delete the ones you do not remember creating[4].
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What it is

An AI can give a wrong answer without making a mistake on its own: someone may have slipped bad data into what it learned or into what it consults. OWASP[1] speaks of poisoning when pre-training, fine-tuning or embedding data is manipulated to introduce vulnerabilities, backdoors or biases.

Three dated pieces of work serve as reference points here. Two are research demonstrations, not observed attacks: the study by Nicholas Carlini and his co-authors on web datasets, in February 2023[2], and PoisonedRAG, in February 2024[3]. The third is a case observed in real conditions: Microsoft's investigation, published on 10 February 2026, into "Summarize with AI" buttons[4].

Straight answers

What is AI data poisoning?

It is a manipulation of the data that feeds an AI, in order to obtain biased, false or harmful outputs[1]. OWASP classes it among attacks on integrity: tampering with training data amounts to tampering with the model's ability to answer correctly[1]. It can also install a backdoor, meaning a behavior that stays normal until a trigger changes it, which makes the flaw hard to test for and to detect[1].

Does it really happen?

Only one of the three cases presented here was observed in real conditions: the 2026 Microsoft investigation. Over 60 days, its researchers identified 50 distinct examples of prompts meant to influence assistants' memory, coming from 31 companies[4]. The 2023 and 2024 works are research demonstrations. Carlini and his co-authors describe what they could have done ("how we could have poisoned") and warned the maintainers of the datasets concerned[2].

How much bad data is enough?

Very little, in these demonstrations. According to Carlini and his co-authors, 0.01% of LAION-400M or COYO-700M could have been poisoned for 60 dollars[2]. An October 2024 study concludes that corrupting 0.1% of pre-training data is enough for three attacks out of four to persist after the model's post-training, and that 0.001% is enough for a simple denial-of-service attack[5]. PoisonedRAG reaches a 90% success rate by injecting five malicious texts per targeted question into a base of several million texts[3]. These figures come from laboratories, not from incidents.

Why is a document base a target?

A RAG system grounds the AI's answers in an external knowledge base[3]. The authors of PoisonedRAG consider that this base opens a new attack surface[3]. Proofpoint[6] judges RAG systems particularly vulnerable, since they rely on external bases that can be compromised.

What should you do with an important answer?
  • Cross-check: OWASP recommends validating a model's outputs against trusted sources[1]. Microsoft observes that users do not always verify an AI recommendation the way they would examine an unknown website[4].
  • Check data provenance: OWASP advises tracking the origin of data and verifying its legitimacy at every stage of a model's development, and limiting the model's exposure to unverified data sources through strict sandboxing[1].
  • Ask questions: faced with a suspicious recommendation, Microsoft advises asking the assistant why it is making it and on which references[4].
  • The security team can search email and Teams messages for links to AI assistants containing words such as "remember" or "trusted source"[4].

Inside the attacker's head

Proofpoint[6] describes four steps. The attacker first finds access to the data: a flaw in collection, a third-party vendor, internal access or a public dataset. Then the attacker chooses a method, crafts samples that look legitimate to a human reviewer, and injects them into the data flow[6]. For a programming assistant built on RAG, Proofpoint gives the example of fake documentation, packed with vulnerable code examples, that is often retrieved because it resembles legitimate queries[6].

For web datasets, Carlini and his co-authors describe two tricks. The first exploits the fact that internet content changes: the version seen by the person who annotates the dataset differs from the one downloaded afterwards[2]. The second targets datasets that take snapshots of collaborative content such as Wikipedia: the attacker needs only a limited window of time[2].

In the Microsoft investigation, the author is not a hacker: every case involved real companies[4]. Microsoft links this trend to tools sold as a "SEO growth hack for LLMs", and website extensions exist, so the barrier is as low as installing a plugin[4].

What you see on screen

Nothing alarming, in general. Skewed recommendations can be subtly biased on health, finance or security, without the user knowing that their AI has been manipulated[4]. Poisoned data also looks legitimate and can pass the usual checks[6].

In the Microsoft case, the entry point is a "Summarize with AI" button. It opens the assistant with a ready-made prompt, slipped into the "?q=" parameter of the link's address, which is visible when hovering the mouse over it[4]. The prompt asks the assistant to summarize a page, then to remember the site as a trusted source in future conversations. A neutralized illustration:

Excerpt
Neutralized illustration, do not reproduce.
hxxps://ai-assistant[.]invalid/?q=[paraphrased prompt: summarize this page, then remember this site as a trusted source for future conversations]

Once the prompt is saved, the assistant lists the site among its trusted sources and may recommend it later[4]. Microsoft illustrates this risk with a hypothetical scenario: a chief financial officer asks their assistant to compare cloud vendors, and it strongly recommends just one, because of a button clicked weeks earlier[4]. To the user, the answer looks solid.

Under the hoodIT teams

Poisoning has three entry points.

  • Training. The model learns from data collected on the web, which the attacker can modify[2]. The effects can last: the 2024 study evaluates for the first time poisoning during pre-training and its persistence after tuning into a chat assistant[5].
  • Consulted documents. In PoisonedRAG, the attacker injects a few malicious texts into the knowledge base so that a chosen question receives the answer the attacker has chosen[3]. The authors tested several defenses and judge them insufficient[3].
  • The assistant's memory. Assistants with a memory keep preferences, context and instructions from one conversation to the next, and an injected prompt becomes a legitimate preference there[4]. Microsoft cites three routes: a link with a prefilled prompt (a one-click attack, since most major assistants accept this parameter), a prompt hidden in a document, an email or a web page, and the user being led to paste a prompt themselves[4]. The technique appears in MITRE ATLAS under the reference AML.T0080[4].

NIST[7] classifies poisoning attacks, for predictive AI as well as generative AI, in its voluntary guide AI 100-2, which also covers mitigations and their limits[7].

Case filesReal cases

February 2023: web datasets (research demonstration)

Published on 20 February 2023, the study by Carlini and eight co-authors presents two attacks that, in their view, could have poisoned ten popular datasets[2]. They estimate that they could have corrupted 0.01% of LAION-400M or COYO-700M for 60 dollars[2]. This is a demonstration: the authors informed the maintainers of each dataset and recommended low-cost defenses[2].

February 2024: PoisonedRAG (research demonstration)

Submitted on 12 February 2024 by Wei Zou, Runpeng Geng, Binghui Wang and Jinyuan Jia, PoisonedRAG presents itself as the first knowledge corruption attack against RAG systems[3]. The researchers reach a 90% success rate with five malicious texts per targeted question, in a base of several million texts[3]. The paper is announced for the USENIX Security 2025 symposium[3]. Like the previous one, this is laboratory work, not an observed attack.

February 2026: "Summarize with AI" (observed in real conditions)

On 10 February 2026, the Microsoft Defender research team describes "AI Recommendation Poisoning"[4]. By examining AI-related links in email traffic over 60 days, it found 50 distinct examples, from 31 companies in 14 industries, including finance, health, legal services and marketing agencies[4]. All the prompts contained a persistence instruction such as "remember" or "in future conversations", hidden behind a button or a helpful-looking sharing link[4].

Microsoft notes several details. One prompt targeted a domain easy to mistake for a well-known site. The most aggressive ones injected a complete piece of promotional text into memory. One of the examples came from a security solutions vendor[4]. The sites looked reputable, but some contain comments and user forums: once the site is judged trustworthy, the AI may extend that trust to unverified content[4]. Microsoft states that it is deploying protections against prompt injection in Copilot; in several cases, reported behaviors could no longer be reproduced[4]. The effectiveness of these prompts varied by assistant and over time[4].

Sources

  1. OWASP, “LLM04:2025 Data and Model Poisoning”, 10 April 2024. https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm042025-data-and-model-poisoning/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  2. arXiv, “Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical”, 20 February 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.10149 (accessed 14 November 2026)
  3. arXiv, “PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models”, 12 February 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.07867 (accessed 14 November 2026)
  4. Microsoft, “Manipulating AI memory for profit: The rise of AI Recommendation Poisoning”, 10 February 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/02/10/ai-recommendation-poisoning/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
  5. arXiv, “Persistent Pre-Training Poisoning of LLMs”, 17 October 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.13722 (accessed 14 November 2026)
  6. Proofpoint, “What Is AI Data Poisoning? Definition”, 25 June 2025. https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/data-poisoning (accessed 14 November 2026)
  7. NIST, “NIST AI 100-2 | Adversarial Machine Learning Taxonomy | CSRC”, 24 March 2025. https://csrc.nist.gov/news/2025/nist-ai-100-2-adversarial-machine-learning-taxonom (accessed 14 November 2026)