The corporate VPN: what it protects and its limits
What a corporate VPN does when working remotely, what CISA observed on compromised gateways, and zero trust according to NIST.
On this page
In 30 seconds
- Where it happens
- When working from home or travelling, when an employee needs to reach internal resources from outside[3].
- What CISA observed
- Attackers placed "webshells" on Pulse Connect Secure gateways and harvested credentials; it recommends assuming the adversary has moved beyond the device, into the network[4].
- The reflex
- To work remotely, use only the VPN provided and approved by the company, and leave gateway updates to the IT team.
- If it is already done
- If an unapproved VPN application is installed on the computer, tell the IT team rather than keep quiet about it.
What it is
A VPN (virtual private network) connects a computer to another network through the Internet. A company's VPN gives the employee access to the organization's resources. According to NIST, an SSL VPN provides secure remote access to an organization's resources[2].
This page explains what the company VPN provides, what remote work requires protecting, and what CISA observed when VPN gateways were compromised.
Straight answers
What does a corporate VPN do?
It gives secure access to the organization's resources from outside. NIST describes two families. In an IPsec VPN, protection is applied at the network level: IPsec is a set of open standards for private communications over IP networks, and its configuration generally goes through the IKE protocol[1]. In an SSL VPN, the user connects with a web browser to a VPN device, and the traffic between the two is encrypted[2].
What does an SSL VPN give access to?
According to NIST, it can provide remote access to web applications and to client/server applications, as well as a connection to internal networks[2]. Because the SSL protocol is included in all standard browsers, special configuration of the computer is often not necessary[2].
IPsec or SSL: which one does the company choose?
That choice belongs to the organization. NIST notes that many organizations must choose between an IPsec VPN and an SSL VPN when planning their deployment[2]. The employee does not have to decide: they use what the company has chosen.
What does "zero trust" say about the trust placed in the network?
NIST writes that this approach grants no implicit trust to a device or an account based solely on its physical or network location, or on its ownership (company or personal device)[5]. The UK's NCSC asks that no network between the device and the service be trusted, including the local network[6].
How it works
NIST describes the telework and remote access technologies that employees, contractors, partners, vendors and others use to work from outside. It states that all components of these technologies, including organization-provided devices and personal devices (BYOD), should be secured against the expected threats[3].
For an SSL VPN, the user connects to one or more of the organization's VPN devices[2]. In the zero trust model, protection focuses on users, devices and resources rather than on a network perimeter[5]. Authentication and authorization, of the user and of the device, are separate functions there, carried out before a session to a resource is opened[5].
The NCSC adds a caveat: a zero trust architecture changes the way usual protections, such as blocking malicious sites and protecting against phishing, are implemented, and they may need to be provided by other solutions[6].
What you do
- Use the VPN provided by the company when you access its resources from outside, whether working from home or travelling. This is Brain's advice.
- Do not install a remote access program that the organization has not approved. CISA lists these programs among those to remove after a compromise[4].
- Let the IT team keep the gateway up to date: CISA recommends that organizations move to the latest software version[4].
- If the IT team announces an incident on the VPN and asks you to change your password, do it without delay: CISA recommends changing the passwords of all accounts that go through the affected VPN environment[4].
Pitfalls
Vulnerabilities that already had patches
According to a note from Ivanti relayed by CISA, the exploitation attempts targeted vulnerabilities that had already been patched in 2019 and 2020[4].
Fraudulent access that looks like normal use
CISA notes that the actor used devices installed in private homes (network storage, small business routers), located in the victim's country, as relays. Its activity thus blended into teleworkers' traffic[4]. Some connections could be spotted through an "impossible travel" calculation: the same username appeared from two addresses too far apart at the same time[4].
Resetting the device is not enough
CISA warns that a factory reset of the gateway removes the malicious code from the device, but not necessarily the attacker from the environment. They can reuse the harvested credentials to return, even after a full update[4].
Checking at the wrong time
The integrity checking tool detects the attacker's cleanup traces only on the version currently running. There is only one rollback partition, replaced at each update: if the device was updated without running the right version of the tool, the abnormal activity is not detected[4].
Real cases
Pulse Connect Secure, 2020 and 2021
In April 2021, CISA reports compromises affecting US government agencies, critical infrastructure entities and other private organizations, starting in June 2020 or earlier, through vulnerabilities in Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure products[4]. Since March 31, 2021, CISA and Ivanti had been helping several entities whose vulnerable products had been exploited[4].
To get in, the actor used several vulnerabilities, including CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2020-8260, CVE-2020-8243 and CVE-2021-22893[4]. It then placed "webshells" on the device to keep access. The known webshells made it possible to bypass authentication, including multifactor authentication, to log passwords and to persist through updates[4]. One of the modified files, Login.cgi, made it possible to harvest the credentials of authenticated users[4].
Ivanti published a device integrity checking tool on March 31, 2021[4]. In August 2021, CISA reports that Ivanti released version 9.1R12 to address multiple vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit to take control of an affected system[4]. In April 2021, CISA states that details on lateral movement and post-intrusion actions were still unknown[4].
Sources
- NIST, “Guide to IPsec VPNs”, 30 June 2020. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/77/r1/final (accessed 10 November 2026)
- NIST, “Guide to SSL VPNs”, 1 July 2008. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/113/final (accessed 10 November 2026)
- NIST, “Guide to Enterprise Telework, Remote Access, and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Security”, 29 July 2016. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/46/r2/final (accessed 10 November 2026)
- CISA, “Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Vulnerabilities”, 20 April 2021. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-110a (accessed 10 November 2026)
- NIST, “Zero Trust Architecture”, 11 August 2020. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/207/final (accessed 10 November 2026)
- NCSC (UK), “Zero trust architecture design principles”. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/zero-trust/architecture-design-principles (accessed 10 November 2026)
Cite this article
Brain, “The corporate VPN: what it protects and its limits”, Cyberpedia, 2026. https:/
BibTeX
@misc{brain_cp226_en_2026,
author = {Brain},
title = {The corporate VPN: what it protects and its limits},
year = {2026},
howpublished = {Cyberpedia},
url = {https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/corporate-vpn-vs-consumer-vpn/},
note = {CC BY 4.0}
}