---
id: CP-507
slug: securing-mcp-connectors-internal-tools
lang: en
title: Securing MCP connectors
description: An AI assistant linked to email, files or databases acts with your rights. The risks and employee steps.
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license: CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
cite_as: Brain, "Securing MCP connectors", Cyberpedia, 2026. https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/securing-mcp-connectors-internal-tools/ (CC BY 4.0)
wing: 4
theme: master_ai
reflex: air-048
schema: G3
updated: "2026-11-10"
translations:
  en: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/securing-mcp-connectors-internal-tools/
  fr: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/fr/articles/securiser-connecteurs-mcp-outils-internes/
  de: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/de/articles/mcp-konnektoren-absichern/
  es: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/es/articles/asegurar-conectores-mcp-herramientas-internas/
  it: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/it/articles/proteggere-connettori-mcp-strumenti-interni/
  nl: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/nl/articles/mcp-connectoren-beveiligen-interne-hulpmiddelen/
  pl: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/pl/articles/zabezpieczanie-konektorow-mcp-narzedzi-wewnetrznych/
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  ja: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/ja/articles/mcp-konekuta-no-anzen-kakuho/
sources:
  - "n": 1
    title: LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency
    publisher: OWASP
    url: https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/
    published: "2024-04-10"
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 2
    title: LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection
    publisher: OWASP
    url: https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/
    published: "2024-04-10"
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 3
    title: Prompt injection is not SQL injection (it may be worse)
    publisher: NCSC (UK)
    url: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/prompt-injection-is-not-sql-injection
    published: "2025-12-08"
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 4
    title: Zero Trust as a security foundation
    publisher: Microsoft
    url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/zero-trust/zero-trust-overview
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 5
    title: LLM03:2025 Supply Chain
    publisher: OWASP
    url: https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm032025-supply-chain/
    published: "2024-04-10"
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 6
    title: Guidelines for secure AI system development
    publisher: NCSC (UK)
    url: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development
    published: "2023-11-27"
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
---

# Securing MCP connectors

An AI assistant becomes more useful when it is linked to your work tools: email, files, databases. Each link also gives it the power to act. With these connectors, the assistant acts with real rights.

This page explains the risks that OWASP and the British NCSC describe for assistants linked to tools, then what the employee does on their side.

## In 30 seconds

- Where it happens: in an AI assistant linked to a mailbox, a file space or a database, through extensions that the model can call to act following a request [1].
- What the attacker wants: to make the assistant act in their place, through booby-trapped content it reads, or through a compromised extension [1].
- The reflex: enable only the connectors approved by the IT department (DSI), read each authorization request before approving, grant only the rights that are needed, and report any unexpected behavior.
- If it has already happened: remove the connector or the rights granted and notify the IT department without delay.

## Straight answers

### What makes a connector risky?

A system based on a language model often receives from its developer the ability to call functions or interact with other systems, through extensions, to act following a request [1]. OWASP calls "Excessive Agency" the flaw that allows damaging actions in response to unexpected, ambiguous or manipulated outputs from the model, whatever the cause of the malfunction [1]. The root cause generally comes down to one or more of these three things: too much functionality, too many permissions, too much autonomy [1].

### Can an assistant be fooled by a simple text?

Yes. Prompt injection is the case where a piece of content changes the model's behavior in an unintended way [2]. In its indirect form, the model reads an external source, such as a website or a file, and that content changes its behavior [2]. The NCSC gives the example of a CV that contains hidden text asking to ignore the previous instructions and approve the application [3]. The instructions do not need to be readable by a human, as long as the model parses them [2].

### Is a technical protection enough?

No. The NCSC writes that current large models "simply do not enforce a security boundary between instructions and data inside a prompt" [3]. It estimates that prompt injection attacks might never be totally mitigated the way SQL injections were [3]. OWASP notes that retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and fine-tuning do not completely remove the flaw [2]. The remaining risk is managed through design and operation [3].

### What does the employee do, concretely?

They apply four steps, detailed below: choose approved connectors, read the authorizations, limit the rights, report. OWASP places the core controls (tool rights, controls on the systems side) in the extensions and the downstream systems [1].

## How it works

The assistant decides, from the request and from what it reads, which extension to call. Agent-based systems call the model repeatedly and rely on the outputs of earlier calls to guide the following ones [1]. Booby-trapped content read at the start of a chain can therefore influence the actions that follow. OWASP lists among the common triggers an injection coming from a malicious user, from an earlier call to a malicious or compromised extension, or, in multi-agent systems, from a compromised peer agent [1].

The NCSC draws the consequence for tools: when the system calls tools or APIs based on the model's output, an attacker can force it to use them, and the impact becomes that of "whatever the worse case scenario would be of giving an attacker direct access to those tools/APIs" [3]. The NCSC also cites a simple rule: when a model processes information from a party, its privileges drop to those of that party [3]. An assistant that reads emails from any external sender should therefore not have access to privileged tools [3].

Third-party pre-trained models and data are external elements that can be manipulated through tampering or poisoning [5]. An attacker can also compromise a vendor's account on a model repository, or create a similar one, then add social engineering [5].

## What you do

- Install only the connectors approved by the IT department. The measures recommended on the organization side are to vet suppliers carefully, to use only trusted suppliers and to use only models from verifiable sources [5]. A connector found on a website or received by message must be submitted to the IT department before any use.
- Read the authorization request before approving. OWASP recommends that a human approve high-impact actions before they are carried out, for example publishing content on the user's behalf [1]. This approval has value only if the person reads what they approve: the recipient and the action requested.
- Never grant more rights than needed. OWASP gives the example of an email-reading extension, which does not need to be able to delete or send messages [1]. When a connector asks for a connection, the most restricted level of access should be preferred, for example read-only [1].
- Report any unexpected behavior. OWASP recommends logging and monitoring extension activity to spot undesirable actions and react [1]. The NCSC adds that failed tool or API calls can reveal the first stages of an attack [3]. A strange message, an unrequested send or an unusual access request must be passed on to the IT department.

## Pitfalls

First pitfall: believing in a block based on forbidden words. The NCSC warns against "deny-listing", because there are endless ways to rephrase an attack to avoid a filter [3]. Likewise, it urges caution toward products that claim to "stop" prompt injection [3].

Second pitfall: confusing a useful connector with a proportionate one. OWASP describes a developer who only wants to read documents, but whose third-party extension also allows modifying and deleting them [1]. It also describes a read extension that connects to a database with an identity holding read, write and delete rights [1], and an extension that accesses all users' files with a privileged account when it should act only for the current user [1].

Third pitfall: leaving unused extensions in place. OWASP cites an extension tried during development, then abandoned, that nevertheless remains available to the agent [1].

Fourth pitfall: approving out of reflex. OWASP describes an assistant linked to a mailbox to summarize incoming messages. A booby-trapped email makes it search the mailbox for sensitive information and forward it to the attacker [1]. Among the countermeasures, the user reads and approves by hand each email drafted by the extension before it is sent [1].

Fifth pitfall: believing the internal network protects. According to Microsoft, the "Zero Trust" principle rests on "never trust, always verify": access is granted after verification, continuously, and users and workloads get only the access they need, for the shortest duration [4]. These principles also apply to AI workloads [4].

The NCSC guidelines for secure AI system development, published on 27 November 2023, cover design, development, deployment, then operation and maintenance, including logging and monitoring [6]. They are addressed to AI system providers and to risk owners [6].

## Sources

1. OWASP, "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency", 10 April 2024. https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
2. OWASP, "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection", 10 April 2024. https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
3. NCSC (UK), "Prompt injection is not SQL injection (it may be worse)", 8 December 2025. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/prompt-injection-is-not-sql-injection (accessed 10 November 2026)
4. Microsoft, "Zero Trust as a security foundation". https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/zero-trust/zero-trust-overview (accessed 10 November 2026)
5. OWASP, "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain", 10 April 2024. https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm032025-supply-chain/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
6. NCSC (UK), "Guidelines for secure AI system development", 27 November 2023. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development (accessed 10 November 2026)

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