---
id: CP-192
slug: mfa-factors-comparison
lang: en
title: MFA factors compared
description: "SMS code, app code, push notification or FIDO2 key: what each MFA factor protects, what defeats it, and which order to prefer."
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cite_as: Brain, "MFA factors compared", Cyberpedia, 2026. https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/mfa-factors-comparison/ (CC BY 4.0)
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updated: "2026-11-14"
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sources:
  - "n": 1
    title: Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA
    publisher: CISA
    url: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 2
    title: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, Technique T1621 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
    publisher: MITRE ATT&CK
    url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621/
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 3
    title: NIST Special Publication 800-63B
    publisher: NIST
    url: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 4
    title: What are risk detections? - Microsoft Entra ID Protection
    publisher: Microsoft
    url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 5
    title: Recommandation relative à l'authentification multifacteur
    publisher: CNIL
    url: https://www.cnil.fr/sites/cnil/files/2025-03/recommandation_relative_a_l_authentification_multifacteur.pdf
    published: "2025-03-20"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 6
    title: Microsoft Entra authentication overview - Microsoft Entra ID
    publisher: Microsoft
    url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/overview-authentication
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 7
    title: Multi-factor authentication for your corporate online services
    publisher: NCSC (UK)
    url: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mfa-for-your-corporate-online-services
    published: "2024-09-26"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
---

# MFA factors compared

In practice, an employee meets four multi-factor authentication (MFA) factors: the code received by SMS, the code from an app (TOTP), the push notification to approve, and the FIDO2 security key. They do not protect in the same way. CISA writes that any form of MFA is better than no MFA, but that some forms are vulnerable to phishing, push bombing, exploitation of the SS7 protocol or SIM swapping [1].

This page goes through the factors one by one: what the person sees, what protects them, what defeats the factor. It then gives an order of preference and the reflex to adopt when a notification arrives that you did not ask for.

## In 30 seconds

- Where it happens: when signing in to email, the network or company tools, whenever a second factor is added to the password.
- What the attacker wants: to obtain the second factor, either by getting the code typed into a fake site, or by sending notifications until the victim accepts one [1].
- The reflex: accept only the sign-in requests you started yourself, and report suspicious or unsolicited requests [2].

## Straight answers

### Are the four factors equally good?

No. CISA ranks forms of MFA from strongest to weakest. At the top come FIDO/WebAuthn and solutions based on public key infrastructure (PKI), described as phishing-resistant. Next come app codes, push notifications with number matching (entering in the app numbers displayed by the platform) and code tokens. Then push notifications without number matching. SMS or voice calls close the list [1].

### Which factor resists phishing?

Among the four, the FIDO2 key. CISA states that the only widely available phishing-resistant authentication is FIDO/WebAuthn [1]. NIST explains why the other factors fail: when the user types a value by hand (app code, code received through another channel), that entry does not bind the value to the current session, and a fake site can relay it to the real one [3]. WebAuthn, by contrast, chooses the authentication secret based on the authenticated domain name of the site, which NIST calls verifier name binding [3].

### What can a fake site steal?

CISA describes a common case: an email leads the victim to a site that imitates the company sign-in portal, and the victim enters their username, password and the 6-digit code from their app [1]. Microsoft describes a variant, the attacker in the middle: an authentication session tied to a malicious reverse proxy, through which the attacker can intercept credentials, tokens included [4].

### What should you do with a notification you did not ask for?

Refuse it. MITRE ATT&CK recommends training users to accept only requests that come from a sign-in they started, to check the origin location of the attempt, and to report suspicious or unsolicited requests [2]. Microsoft notes that an authentication request the user did not trigger can signal that their credentials are compromised [4].

### Should SMS be banned?

CISA treats it as a last resort, while admitting that it can serve as a temporary solution during the move to a stronger factor [1]. CNIL points out that sending a code by SMS is discouraged by the competent authorities, but that an SMS code combined with another factor from a distinct category offers a higher level of security than simple authentication [5]. NIST lists use of the telephone network for out-of-band authentication among restricted authenticators, and it named only one at the date of publication [3].

## How it works

Each factor is read from three angles: what you see, what protects, what defeats it.

- The code received by SMS. You receive a code on your phone and retype it on the sign-in page [1]. Combined with another factor, it protects better than a password alone [5]. It is vulnerable to phishing, to exploitation of the SS7 protocol and to SIM swapping, where the attacker has your number transferred to a SIM card they control [1]. CNIL adds that carrier or operating system solutions make it possible to read SMS messages on a device other than the phone, so the uniqueness of the device is not always ensured [5].
- The code from an app (TOTP). You read a 6-digit code in the app and enter it [1]. This factor resists push bombing, and SS7 and SIM swap attacks do not apply to it [1]. It remains vulnerable to phishing [1]. In CNIL's first example, the app checks a PIN locally before generating the proof of possession, which reduces the risk of identity theft through theft of the mobile [5]. In its fourth example, an app is installed on the device by the employer and activated by the employer [5].
- The push notification to approve. A window appears on the phone and you tap the Accept button [1]. With number matching, you also have to enter in the app the numbers displayed by the platform [1]. Without it, this factor is vulnerable to push bombing and to user error [1]. With it, it resists push bombing but remains vulnerable to phishing [1]. NIST no longer accepts the method where values are compared and then approved, because it increases the risk of approving without comparing, a risk seen in authentication fatigue attacks [3].
- The FIDO2 security key. You plug in or tap a physical key (USB or NFC), or you use an authenticator built into the computer or phone [1]. Authentication may add a biometric or a PIN [1]. CISA ranks it among the phishing-resistant forms [1], and NIST describes the WebAuthn mechanism (a secret tied to the site's domain name) [3]. Microsoft recommends passkeys (FIDO2) and FIDO2 security keys, as well as Windows Hello for Business and certificate-based authentication, because these methods offer the most secure sign-in [6].

For administrators, the NCSC (UK) published a guide on the strongest forms of MFA on 26 September 2024. Its update recommends that organisations adopt techniques that protect better against phishing [7].

## What you do

- When several factors are offered, CISA's order, from strongest to weakest, is as follows: FIDO2 key, then app code or push notification with number matching, then simple push notification, and SMS last [1]. For small and medium-sized businesses that cannot move right away to phishing-resistant MFA, CISA considers the app code, the code token or the push notification with number matching the best options [1].
- When a notification arrives that you did not start, refuse it and report it [2]. At Microsoft, the "User reported suspicious activity" detection fires when a user denies an MFA request and reports it as suspicious activity, provided the reporting feature is enabled [4].
- If the company asks you to use your personal phone, CNIL recalls that the employer must in principle provide work tools. Using personal equipment is possible in some cases, with alternatives for employees who have no compatible personal device or who do not want to use it for work purposes [5].

## Pitfalls

- The 6-digit code does not protect against the fake site: an app code or a code received through another channel can be relayed by a fraudulent site [3].
- Notification fatigue. MITRE ATT&CK describes attackers who, holding valid credentials, repeat attempts to bombard the victim with notifications, SMS messages and calls until they accept through MFA fatigue [2]. CNIL specifies that most users refuse notifications they did not initiate, but that through repetition one of them may accept one out of annoyance or lack of attention [5]. It lists three countermeasures on the company side: displaying the location, device type and time of the attempt, limiting how often notifications are sent, and requiring number matching [5]. APT29, LAPSUS$ and Scattered Spider have used this technique [2].
- A code sent by email does not count as a possession factor for CNIL, which then speaks of 2-step verification and not of multi-factor authentication [5]. NIST prohibits the use of email for out-of-band authentication [3].
- Multiplying MFA where it is not needed can make the user lose vigilance, which reduces its effectiveness where it is needed, according to CNIL [5].
- Losing the factor blocks access: CNIL asks that reissuing a new factor not weaken security [5].

## Sources

1. CISA, "Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA". https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf (accessed 14 November 2026)
2. MITRE ATT&CK, "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, Technique T1621 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®". https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
3. NIST, "NIST Special Publication 800-63B". https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html (accessed 14 November 2026)
4. Microsoft, "What are risk detections? - Microsoft Entra ID Protection". https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks (accessed 14 November 2026)
5. CNIL, "Recommandation relative à l'authentification multifacteur", 20 March 2025. https://www.cnil.fr/sites/cnil/files/2025-03/recommandation_relative_a_l_authentification_multifacteur.pdf (accessed 14 November 2026)
6. Microsoft, "Microsoft Entra authentication overview - Microsoft Entra ID". https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/overview-authentication (accessed 14 November 2026)
7. NCSC (UK), "Multi-factor authentication for your corporate online services", 26 September 2024. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mfa-for-your-corporate-online-services (accessed 14 November 2026)

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