---
id: CP-449
slug: garmin-wastedlocker-ransomware-autopsy
lang: en
title: Autopsy of the WastedLocker ransomware
description: "WastedLocker, ransomware attributed to Indrik Spider (Evil Corp): what it does, what victims see and the reflexes of an employee."
canonical_url: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/garmin-wastedlocker-ransomware-autopsy/
markdown_url: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/garmin-wastedlocker-ransomware-autopsy.md
publisher: Brain (https://startbrain.io)
license: CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
cite_as: Brain, "Autopsy of the WastedLocker ransomware", Cyberpedia, 2026. https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/garmin-wastedlocker-ransomware-autopsy/ (CC BY 4.0)
wing: 2
theme: understand_hacking
reflex: cr-049
schema: G4
updated: "2026-11-10"
translations:
  en: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/garmin-wastedlocker-ransomware-autopsy/
  fr: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/fr/articles/autopsie-garmin-wastedlocker/
  de: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/de/articles/wastedlocker-ransomware-fallanalyse/
  es: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/es/articles/autopsia-ransomware-wastedlocker/
  it: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/it/articles/autopsia-wastedlocker-ransomware/
  nl: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/nl/articles/autopsie-wastedlocker-ransomware/
  pl: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/pl/articles/autopsja-oprogramowania-wymuszajacego-okup-wastedlocker/
  pt: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/pt/articles/autopsia-ransomware-wastedlocker/
  ja: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/ja/articles/wastedlocker-ransomware-kensho/
sources:
  - "n": 1
    title: WastedLocker, Software S0612 | MITRE ATT&CK®
    publisher: MITRE ATT&CK
    url: https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612/
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 2
    title: Indrik Spider, Evil Corp, Manatee Tempest, DEV-0243, UNC2165, Group G0119 | MITRE ATT&CK®
    publisher: MITRE ATT&CK
    url: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119/
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 3
    title: Data Encrypted for Impact, Technique T1486 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
    publisher: MITRE ATT&CK
    url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 4
    title: "DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks | CISA"
    publisher: CISA
    url: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 5
    title: Drive-by Compromise, Technique T1189 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
    publisher: MITRE ATT&CK
    url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 6
    title: Mitigating malware and ransomware attacks
    publisher: NCSC (UK)
    url: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/mitigating-malware-and-ransomware-attacks
    published: "2020-02-13"
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 7
    title: Inhibit System Recovery, Technique T1490 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
    publisher: MITRE ATT&CK
    url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 8
    title: Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations | CISA
    publisher: CISA
    url: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-049a
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
  - "n": 9
    title: État de la menace rançongiciels à l'encontre des entreprises et institutions - CERT-FR
    publisher: CERT-FR (ANSSI)
    url: https://cert.cyber.gouv.fr/cti/CERTFR-2021-CTI-001/
    published: "2021-02-05"
    accessed: "2026-11-10"
---

# Autopsy of the WastedLocker ransomware

WastedLocker is ransomware, meaning software that encrypts an organisation's files to demand money. MITRE ATT&CK links it to Indrik Spider, a group also known as Evil Corp, and notes that it has been used since May 2020 at least, against varied sectors such as manufacturing, IT and media [1].

This article describes what it does, what victims see and the employee's actions.

## In 30 seconds

- Where it happens: on Windows systems, after an intrusion into the organisation's network [1][2].
- What the attacker wants: to encrypt the data, delete the means of restoring it, then obtain a ransom [1][3].
- The reflex: isolate the machine from the network and not pay, because CISA and the FBI do not recommend paying [4]. An unreadable file or a ransom note is reported to the IT team, following your organisation's instructions.
- If it has already happened: remove the machine from all networks and turn off its Wi-Fi and Bluetooth [4].

## Straight answers

### What is WastedLocker?

It is a family of ransomware that runs on Windows. It can encrypt data and leave a ransom note [1].

### Who is behind it?

MITRE ATT&CK attributes it to Indrik Spider, a Russia-based cybercriminal group active since 2014 at least. It started with the Dridex banking trojan, then ran ransomware operations from 2017 with BitPaymer, WastedLocker and Hades [2]. After US sanctions and an indictment in 2019, the group changed its tactics and diversified its tools [2].

### Can an employee trigger it without knowing?

Several entry points are possible. Indrik Spider used fake Flash Player and Google Chrome updates as initial infection vectors, and served fake updates from compromised legitimate sites [2]. It also tried to get users to click on a malicious zip file [2]. More generally, visiting a booby-trapped legitimate site can be enough to give an attacker access, if no other protection stops it [5].

### What does an employee do?

They do not click on a fake browser update or on an unexpected zip file [2]. If an infection is suspected, they remove the machine from the network and turn off Wi-Fi and Bluetooth [4]. Faced with a file that has become unreadable or a ransom note, they tell their IT team, following their organisation's instructions. If the organisation asks them to keep backups of their important files, those backups must stay offline: attackers try to destroy the ones that stay connected [6].

### Should the ransom be paid?

CISA and the FBI do not recommend it: paying can encourage further attacks and does not guarantee that files will be recovered [4]. The British NCSC adds that the computer stays infected after payment and that the victim is more likely to be targeted again [6].

### What should management do?

The NCSC recommends tested backups, kept offline and in another location [6]. It also asks organisations to identify critical systems, prepare a communication plan and rehearse the incident management plan [6]. CISA and the FBI recommend requiring multifactor authentication for remote access, restricting the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and limiting account privileges [4].

## Inside the attacker's head

Indrik Spider used several means to get into a network and stay there. It bought access to victims' VPNs, used valid accounts to get in and move around, and kept access through the VPN infrastructure [2]. It created local accounts added to privileged groups [2], extracted passwords from password managers [2] and used RDP to move from one machine to another [2].

Before encryption, the group also exfiltrated data with Rclone or MEGASync [2], stopped services with PsExec [2] and disabled or reset antivirus software [2]. It created email addresses to talk to its victims, including payment and decryption instructions [2].

## What you see on screen

WastedLocker can leave a ransom note [1]. Here are the usual signs of ransomware encryption.

- Everyday files (Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, source code) are encrypted, often renamed or marked with an attacker-specific tag [3].
- Some ransomware changes the wallpaper or sends ransom notes to connected printers [3].
- The victim is invited to contact the attacker through an anonymous email address or an anonymous web page, and payment is demanded in cryptocurrency [6].
- IT systems can no longer be used, and according to the NCSC recovery can take several weeks [6].

## Under the hood

- Privilege escalation: WastedLocker can bypass User Account Control (UAC) if it is not run with administrator rights [1].
- Stealth: it copies a file from the Windows System32 folder to the %APPDATA% folder under another, hidden name [1]. It can write and run files in an NTFS alternate data stream [1]. Its code contains junk code that hides the real code, and its packing tool CryptOne decrypts the payload with an algorithm based on XOR [1].
- Execution: it creates a service that runs until encryption is finished [1].
- Reconnaissance: just before encrypting, it lists files, directories, accessible network drives and removable drives [1].
- File permissions: it can take ownership of a file and reset its permissions with the takeown.exe command [1].
- Deleting backups: it can delete volume shadow copies [1]. MITRE ATT&CK describes this technique as deleting or disabling system recovery features, to strengthen the effect of encryption [7]. Online backups, those connected to the network, can also be deleted [7].
- Encryption: it encrypts data and leaves a ransom note [1]. Encryption software can also spread like a worm, using valid accounts or Windows shares [3].

## Case files

### A gas compression site, 2020

CISA alert AA20-049A, published in its initial version on 18 February 2020 and revised on 24 October 2020, describes a case in which it does not name the ransomware: it speaks of commodity ransomware. A malicious actor used a phishing link to get into the IT network of a natural gas compression facility, then pivoted to its operational network [8]. The ransomware encrypted systems on both networks, including human-machine interfaces [8]. The programmable logic controllers were not affected and the victim never lost control of operations [8]. It nonetheless decided on a controlled shutdown, of about two days for the whole pipeline [8]. Its emergency plan did not cover cyberattacks [8]. CISA notes insufficient segmentation between the IT and operational networks [8].

### Colonial Pipeline, May 2021

CISA and the FBI published an advisory on 11 May 2021 about an attack on a US pipeline operator: the DarkSide ransomware targeted its IT network [4]. The company said it had disconnected some operational systems as a precaution, and the advisory does not report any movement by the attacker toward them [4]. DarkSide works as ransomware as a service: the developers receive a share of the earnings of the affiliates who deploy it [4]. The attackers encrypt and steal data, then threaten to publish it if the ransom is not paid [4].

### A rise measured in France in 2020

The CERT-FR of the ANSSI notes a 255% increase in 2020 in reports of ransomware attacks within its scope compared with 2019 [9]. It identifies three phenomena: Big Game Hunting, ransomware as a service and double extortion [9].

## Sources

1. MITRE ATT&CK, "WastedLocker, Software S0612 | MITRE ATT&CK®". https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
2. MITRE ATT&CK, "Indrik Spider, Evil Corp, Manatee Tempest, DEV-0243, UNC2165, Group G0119 | MITRE ATT&CK®". https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
3. MITRE ATT&CK, "Data Encrypted for Impact, Technique T1486 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®". https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
4. CISA, "DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks | CISA". https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-131a (accessed 10 November 2026)
5. MITRE ATT&CK, "Drive-by Compromise, Technique T1189 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®". https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
6. NCSC (UK), "Mitigating malware and ransomware attacks", 13 February 2020. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/mitigating-malware-and-ransomware-attacks (accessed 10 November 2026)
7. MITRE ATT&CK, "Inhibit System Recovery, Technique T1490 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®". https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ (accessed 10 November 2026)
8. CISA, "Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations | CISA". https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-049a (accessed 10 November 2026)
9. CERT-FR (ANSSI), "État de la menace rançongiciels à l'encontre des entreprises et institutions - CERT-FR", 5 February 2021. https://cert.cyber.gouv.fr/cti/CERTFR-2021-CTI-001/ (accessed 10 November 2026)

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