---
id: CP-359
slug: fake-supplier-invoices-lookalike-domain
lang: en
title: Fake supplier invoices and lookalike domains
description: "A fake supplier or executive, a near-identical domain, an invoice or a new bank account: how to spot the fraud and what to do."
canonical_url: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/fake-supplier-invoices-lookalike-domain/
markdown_url: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/fake-supplier-invoices-lookalike-domain.md
publisher: Brain (https://startbrain.io)
license: CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
cite_as: Brain, "Fake supplier invoices and lookalike domains", Cyberpedia, 2026. https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/fake-supplier-invoices-lookalike-domain/ (CC BY 4.0)
wing: 5
theme: handle_scams
reflex: cr-083
schema: G5
updated: "2026-11-14"
translations:
  en: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/fake-supplier-invoices-lookalike-domain/
  fr: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/fr/articles/fausses-factures-fournisseurs-domaine-sosie/
  de: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/de/articles/gefaelschte-lieferantenrechnungen-doppelgaenger-domains/
  es: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/es/articles/facturas-falsas-proveedores-dominios-parecidos/
  it: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/it/articles/fatture-false-fornitori-dominio-sosia/
  nl: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/nl/articles/valse-leveranciersfacturen-gelijkende-domeinen/
  pl: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/pl/articles/falszywe-faktury-dostawcow-domena-sobowtor/
  pt: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/pt/articles/faturas-falsas-fornecedores-dominio-sosia/
  ja: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/ja/articles/nise-seikyusho-shiiresaki-kokuji-domain/
sources:
  - "n": 1
    title: La fraude au virement bancaire (FOVI) ou au faux ordre de virement
    publisher: Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr
    url: https://www.cybermalveillance.gouv.fr/tous-nos-contenus/fiches-reflexes/escroquerie-faux-ordres-virement-fovi
    published: "2021-01-27"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 2
    title: "Cybersécurité : quelles sont les 10 cybermalveillances les plus fréquentes ?"
    publisher: Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr
    url: https://www.cybermalveillance.gouv.fr/tous-nos-contenus/actualites/cybersecurite-les-cybermalveillances-les-plus-frequentes
    published: "2022-04-12"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 3
    title: Le faux ordre de virement international ou « fraude au président »
    publisher: CNIL
    url: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/le-faux-ordre-de-virement-international-ou-fraude-au-president
    published: "2021-04-09"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 4
    title: Business Email Compromise Continues to Swindle and Defraud U.S. Businesses
    publisher: CISA
    url: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2015/06/24/business-email-compromise-continues-swindle-and-defraud-us-businesses
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 5
    title: Protecting organizations from AI-assisted executive impersonation and invoice fraud
    publisher: Microsoft
    url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/10/protecting-organizations-ai-assisted-executive-impersonation-invoice-fraud/
    published: "2026-09-10"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 6
    title: Phishing actors exploit complex routing and misconfigurations to spoof domains
    publisher: Microsoft
    url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/01/06/phishing-actors-exploit-complex-routing-and-misconfigurations-to-spoof-domains/
    published: "2026-01-06"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 7
    title: "Email threat landscape: Q3 2026 trends and insights"
    publisher: Microsoft
    url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/05/email-threat-landscape-q3-2026-trends-and-insights/
    published: "2026-11-05"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 8
    title: "Fraude au virement de salaire : comment réagir et que faire ?"
    publisher: CNIL
    url: https://www.cnil.fr/fr/fraude-au-virement-de-salaire-comment-reagir-et-que-faire
    published: "2025-07-23"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
---

# Fake supplier invoices and lookalike domains

Fake transfer order fraud aims, through persuasion, threats or pressure, to get the victim to make an unplanned transfer of funds [1]. One variant impersonates a supplier to pass on new bank details (a change of bank account number) to which a payment must be made [1]. Another presents the request as an order from an executive, marked as urgent and confidential [1].

People in charge of payments and purchasing are on the front line: the attacker tries to find out who handles them and what validation processes exist [3]. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr [2] ranks the fake transfer order, in its 2021 data, as the sixth most sought-after assistance request among companies and associations.

## In 30 seconds

- Where it happens: by email, by phone, or both, in every type of organisation [1].
- What the attacker wants: to have money paid into a bank account held by cybercriminals [1].
- The reflex: confirm any unexpected invoice or change of bank details by calling a known contact, never the number in the message, and have a second person validate [3][4].
- If it is already done: tell your manager and the accounting team, alert the bank to ask for the funds to be recalled, then file a complaint [1].

## Straight answers

### How do you recognise a lookalike domain?

The CNIL [3] describes two methods. Typosquatting registers a name close to the company's by changing one character, like a typing error ("enterprise" or "entrreprise"). Cybersquatting changes, for example, the extension of the site, from entreprise.fr to entreprise.com [3]. The CNIL advises checking the domain names of the emails received: do the name and the extension match the company's official site [3]?

### What should you do with a new bank account number on an invoice?

Confirm it before any payment. The CNIL [3] recommends contacting the company's known contacts by phone or in person, rather than using the details in the email, to get confirmation of the payment or of the change. Among the methods the CISA [4] lists, one is to call to confirm the request orally, using a number that should come from a list of the supplier's known contacts and not from the email; it advises keeping that list preferably in non-electronic form [4].

### Do you need validation by two people?

Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr [1] advises an internal hierarchical verification and validation procedure, with no exceptions allowed, for unplanned transfer requests and changes of bank details. The CISA [4] cites dual approval for any transfer above a threshold, to a new business partner, or to new bank details of an existing partner. If the bank calls to have a transfer verified, the CISA says to delay the operation until further checks are made [4].

### Does AI change the fraud?

Microsoft [5] observes that AI has allowed fraudsters to improve their email templates and tailor them to recipients. Spoofing an executive's internal address is not new [5].

### Is a message from an executive's internal address safe?

No. An attacker can write from an internal mailbox whose password has been stolen [3]. Microsoft [6] also describes messages that look internal because anti-spoofing protections are misconfigured, which does not affect customers whose MX records point to Office 365 [6].

### What if the transfer has already gone through?

Identify all transfers executed, pending or upcoming to the fraudulent bank details, inform your manager and the accounting team, and ask for those details to be blocked in business applications [1]. Alert the bank as soon as possible to ask for the funds to be recalled, keep the evidence (numbers, messages, transfer orders, invoices) and file a complaint [1].

## Inside the attacker's head

According to the CNIL [3], the attack starts with an analysis of the company. Recruitment information and organisation charts, often online, show who works in which department and how the chain of decision is organised [3]. The attacker then creates a domain close to that of the target or one of its suppliers, and sends a targeted phishing email. It may cite precise details about a payment or an order in progress to make the fake order look more legitimate [3].

The CISA [4] describes a more direct route. The attacker compromises the mailbox of an executive or a supplier, reads the exchanges, sometimes forwards them automatically to an account of their own, and waits until they feel at ease before sending transfer instructions [4]. When they use a spoofed address, the difference from the real one is very subtle [4].

In a 2026 campaign, Microsoft [5] notes signs consistent with the use of AI to produce the templates: abundant HTML comments and a very uniform construction. These signs do not suffice to establish the exact share of AI [5].

## What you see on screen

In the campaign described by Microsoft [5], the CEO's name appears in the sender name, the reply name and the signature. The body of the message approves the invoice below and offers to request a PDF version [5]. Under the signature, a fake forwarded message contains a detailed invoice in the supplier's colours: number, dates, currency, amount, line items, and a billing section naming the company and the executive as the invoice recipients [5]. The payment requested is a transfer to accounts the attacker controls [5].

Microsoft [5] lists visible flaws:

- The fake forwarded thread lacks the headers of a real forward [5].
- The displayed name does not match the sender's address, and the subject reuses finance words [5].
- In a real thread, earlier messages are normally indented or grouped, whereas here they are aligned to the left [5].
- The CEO asks not to be copied, then approves the invoice from their own address [5].

In another campaign, Microsoft [6] describes a fake thread between the CEO and a supposed contractor, a message urging quick payment to keep a discount, and, in most of the emails, three attachments: the invoice, a US tax form W-9 and a fake letter from the bank repeating the same bank details [6]. The accounting department's address appears as both sender and recipient [6].

## Under the hood

Email protections do not block everything. Microsoft [6] explains that a domain can be spoofed when MX records do not point to Office 365 and protections are not strictly enforced. In its example, a DMARC set to the value none lets the message through to the inbox [6]. According to Microsoft, a DMARC set to reject and a SPF set to hard fail prevent these attacks [6].

A malicious message can also be delivered because of an exception. Microsoft [7] detected about 129 million malicious messages spoofing the sender domains of business services tracked in its analysis, in the third quarter of 2026. In September, organisation or user exceptions applied to 63% of the messages whose security result was recorded [7]. A September campaign passed SPF, DKIM and DMARC successfully, while changing the display name to imitate a sales or HR department of the targeted organisation [7]. Successful authentication therefore does not prove that you are talking to the right person.

Invoice payment requests that impersonate a business contact are rising. According to Microsoft [7], their volume increased by 89% in September 2026, and their share reached 3% in September, among attacks impersonating a business contact, its highest level since March [7].

The fraud can also target salaries. In a case described by the CNIL and inspired by real events, an email displaying an employee's name, but sent from an external free mailbox, asked HR to change the bank account for salary payments [8]. The request was processed, and the investigation found three other suspicious requests, based on the bank account number and the name of the institution used by the fraudster [8]. The identities came from the company's advertising magazine [8]. The new rule: a request to change a bank account is made in person, or from an internal address followed by a verification over video call [8].

## Case files

### August 2026: more than a million fake executive emails

Between 3 and 5 August 2026, Microsoft detected a campaign of more than a million emails against company users, sent from several third-party sending service accounts, 87.7% of them addressed to the United States [5]. The attacker posed as CEOs, CFOs or presidents, and asked the accounting departments of the same companies for an ACH payment of nearly 50,000 dollars [5].

The ServiceNow lookalike domain was registered on 31 July, shortly before the campaign [5]. It was used for the address of the fake ServiceNow President and for the contact on the fake invoice [5]. A second domain, registered the same day, was used for the reply address [5]. Microsoft found no evidence that ServiceNow was compromised or involved [5].

```text
Neutralised illustration, not to be reproduced.
Sender name: [name of the targeted company's CEO]
Lookalike domain: service-nowinc[.]com (imitates ServiceNow)
Body: [approval of the invoice below, offer to send the PDF]
Invoice: [fake annual subscription invoice, transfer to an attacker's account]
```

## Sources

1. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr, "La fraude au virement bancaire (FOVI) ou au faux ordre de virement", 27 January 2021. https://www.cybermalveillance.gouv.fr/tous-nos-contenus/fiches-reflexes/escroquerie-faux-ordres-virement-fovi (accessed 14 November 2026)
2. Cybermalveillance.gouv.fr, "Cybersécurité : quelles sont les 10 cybermalveillances les plus fréquentes ?", 12 April 2022. https://www.cybermalveillance.gouv.fr/tous-nos-contenus/actualites/cybersecurite-les-cybermalveillances-les-plus-frequentes (accessed 14 November 2026)
3. CNIL, "Le faux ordre de virement international ou « fraude au président »", 9 April 2021. https://www.cnil.fr/fr/le-faux-ordre-de-virement-international-ou-fraude-au-president (accessed 14 November 2026)
4. CISA, "Business Email Compromise Continues to Swindle and Defraud U.S. Businesses". https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2015/06/24/business-email-compromise-continues-swindle-and-defraud-us-businesses (accessed 14 November 2026)
5. Microsoft, "Protecting organizations from AI-assisted executive impersonation and invoice fraud", 10 September 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/10/protecting-organizations-ai-assisted-executive-impersonation-invoice-fraud/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
6. Microsoft, "Phishing actors exploit complex routing and misconfigurations to spoof domains", 6 January 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/01/06/phishing-actors-exploit-complex-routing-and-misconfigurations-to-spoof-domains/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
7. Microsoft, "Email threat landscape: Q3 2026 trends and insights", 5 November 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/05/email-threat-landscape-q3-2026-trends-and-insights/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
8. CNIL, "Fraude au virement de salaire : comment réagir et que faire ?", 23 July 2025. https://www.cnil.fr/fr/fraude-au-virement-de-salaire-comment-reagir-et-que-faire (accessed 14 November 2026)

---

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