---
id: CP-032
slug: fake-linkedin-profiles-impersonation
lang: en
title: "Fake LinkedIn profiles: professional impersonation"
description: "Fake recruiters, fake experts: how a fake profile on a professional network earns your trust, and how to spot it."
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cite_as: "Brain, \"Fake LinkedIn profiles: professional impersonation\", Cyberpedia, 2026. https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/en/articles/fake-linkedin-profiles-impersonation/ (CC BY 4.0)"
wing: 1
theme: outsmart_social_engineering
reflex: cr-065
schema: G5
updated: "2026-11-14"
translations:
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  ja: https://startbrain.io/cyberpedia/ja/articles/fake-linkedin-profiles-professional-impersonation/
sources:
  - "n": 1
    title: "Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts, Sub-technique T1585.001 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®"
    publisher: MITRE ATT&CK
    url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001/
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 2
    title: SEABORGIUM and TA453 continue their respective spear-phishing campaigns against targets of interest
    publisher: NCSC (UK)
    url: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/spear-phishing-campaigns-targets-of-interest
    published: "2023-01-26"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 3
    title: "Social Media: how to use it safely"
    publisher: NCSC (UK)
    url: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/social-media-how-to-use-it-safely
    published: "2019-01-24"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 4
    title: Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spearphishing Campaigns | CISA
    publisher: CISA
    url: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-341a
    published: "2023-12-07"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 5
    title: "Stealing the LIGHTSHOW (Part One): North Korea's UNC2970"
    publisher: Google
    url: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/lightshow-north-korea-unc2970/
    published: "2023-03-09"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
  - "n": 6
    title: "Lazarus luring employees with trojanized coding challenges: The case of a Spanish aerospace company"
    publisher: ESET
    url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company/
    published: "2023-09-29"
    accessed: "2026-11-14"
---

# Fake LinkedIn profiles: professional impersonation

A fake profile on a professional network is an account that an attacker creates and maintains to build a persona. MITRE ATT&CK describes this work as developing public information, a presence, a history and affiliations that make the persona credible [1]. The persona can be fictitious or can impersonate a real person, on a single site or on several (Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter) [1].

Once the persona is ready, the attacker uses it to make connections with targets, directly or through other accounts, then to move on to the next step, for example a phishing attack through the service itself [1]. This article describes what the targeted employee sees, what happens behind the screen and the documented cases.

## In 30 seconds

- Where it happens: on a professional network, through a message from a fictitious profile or from a profile that impersonates a real person [1].
- What the attacker wants: to win your trust, sometimes through a correspondence spread over time, then to get you to open a link [2].
- The reflex: check the message by another means [2], do not accept a request without knowing who is behind it, and report the fake profile to the platform [3].

## Straight answers

### Is a fake profile always a stranger?

No. According to MITRE ATT&CK, personas can be fictitious or can imitate real people [1]. EXOTIC LILY created profiles that imitate employees of the targeted companies [1]. HEXANE created fake LinkedIn accounts posing as human resources employees, with fake job offers [1].

### Who uses this method?

MITRE ATT&CK lists many groups. Cleaver created fake LinkedIn profiles with photos, details and connections [1]. Magic Hound created fake LinkedIn and other social network accounts to convince its targets, by messages and by voice, to open malicious links [1]. Lazarus Group created fake LinkedIn accounts for Operation Dream Job [1].

### Why does the conversation leave the professional network so quickly?

The NCSC (UK) observes that the groups SEABORGIUM and TA453 mostly write to targets' personal addresses, sometimes to work addresses, and that this can help get around the security controls of corporate networks [2]. Mandiant observes another exit: the fake recruiter tries to move the conversation to WhatsApp [5].

### Can these fake accounts be blocked upstream?

MITRE ATT&CK answers that this technique is difficult to prevent with preventive controls, because it relies on behaviors outside the enterprise's defenses [1]. It suggests that an organization monitor for personas claiming to work for it and for recent accounts that send many connection requests to its employees [1].

### How can you spot a fake account?

The NCSC (UK) gives three clues: an account creation date, when the platform shows it; absurd names made of random letters and numbers; the number of followers, with the caveat that followers can be bought [3]. It also recommends checking that you know the person before accepting a connection [3].

### What should you do about a suspicious profile?

The NCSC (UK) advises contacting by another means a friend or relative whose post looks suspicious or unusual, in case their account has been hacked [3], and reporting fake accounts directly to the platform [3]. For emails, it asks you to consider one question: is the address a known one, and can you verify the message by another means [2]?

## Inside the attacker's head

The attacker starts with research. The NCSC (UK) describes actors who use open sources, including social media and professional networking platforms, to find hooks: the target's interests and real contacts, social or professional [2]. CISA describes the same preparation for Star Blizzard [4].

Next comes building the persona. SEABORGIUM and TA453 created fake profiles posing as respected experts, and used fake invitations to conferences or events and fake approaches from journalists [2]. They also write from consumer email addresses that impersonate contacts known to the target or prominent names in the target's sector [2].

Then comes the trust building. Attackers often start with a harmless contact on a subject the target is supposed to care about, and the correspondence can last a long time [2]. The booby-trapped link only arrives afterwards. The NCSC cites a case where TA453 set up a Zoom call with the target in order to slip the malicious address into the call's chat [2]. According to industry partners cited by the NCSC, two or more personas have also taken part in the same exchange to reinforce the appearance of legitimacy [2].

## What you see on screen

A polished profile, first. Mandiant describes well-crafted, carefully maintained LinkedIn accounts, built on real users to copy their identity, establish an atmosphere of trust and increase the chances of a reply [5]. MITRE ATT&CK, for its part, notes profiles filled with photos, personal details and connections [1].

Then a flattering message, often a job offer. In the cases described by Mandiant, the fake recruiter writes on LinkedIn, then offers to continue on WhatsApp, where he sends a file presented as a job description [5]. In another case, the victim receives a ZIP file said to contain a skills test for an application [5]. In the ESET case, the fake recruiter sends two programming exercises to complete as part of a hiring process [6].

The signs that give away a fake profile, according to the NCSC (UK), are a creation date when it is shown, a name made of random characters and a follower count that proves nothing, since it can be bought [3].

## Under the hood

The link is used to steal credentials: it leads to an attacker's server that reproduces the login page of a legitimate service [2]. The file is used to install malware [5]. In Mandiant's campaign, one of the booby-trapped files is a Word document containing macros that download and run a payload from a remote server; Mandiant saw the attackers tailor the fake job descriptions to each target [5]. The other is a ZIP file containing an ISO image with a trojanized version of the TightVNC software, named after the company for which the victim thought they were taking the test [5]. As soon as the victim launches the application, the software sends a beacon to its command server with the user name and the machine name [5].

In the ESET case, two executables, Quiz1.exe and Quiz2.exe, delivered in ISO images hosted on third-party online storage, display an exercise program (a "Hello, World!" then a Fibonacci sequence) and install additional malware once the result is displayed [6]. ESET identified a previously unseen backdoor, named LightlessCan, whose payload can only be decrypted on the targeted machine, which notably prevents its analysis on a security researcher's computer [6].

For Star Blizzard's email campaigns, CISA points to the open-source tool EvilGinx, which captures credentials and session cookies and so bypasses two-factor authentication [4].

## Case files

### January 2023: SEABORGIUM and TA453 as seen by the NCSC

On 26 January 2023, the NCSC (UK) published an advisory on these two groups, one based in Russia, the other in Iran, which continue to use spear-phishing successfully against organizations and individuals in the United Kingdom and elsewhere [2]. Throughout 2022, the targeted sectors included academia, defense, government, NGOs and think tanks, as well as politicians, journalists and activists [2]. SEABORGIUM was observed creating fake profiles on professional networking sites to carry out its reconnaissance, and TA453 using them to approach its targets [2].

### March 2023: the fake LinkedIn recruiters of UNC2970

On 9 March 2023, Mandiant published its analysis of UNC2970, an espionage group suspected to be North Korean [5]. Mandiant has tracked a campaign against Western media and technology companies since June 2022 [5]. The group now targets users directly on LinkedIn with fake recruiter accounts, built on real users, then brings them over to WhatsApp where it delivers the booby-trapped payload [5]. In at least one case, it kept talking with a victim after the payload had been run and detected, asking for screenshots of the detection [5].

### September 2023: a Spanish aerospace company as seen by ESET

On 29 September 2023, ESET described an attack by the Lazarus group against an aerospace company in Spain [6]. The attackers had gained initial access to the network the year before, after a spear-phishing campaign in which they posed as a Meta recruiter [6]. The fake recruiter contacted several employees through LinkedIn messaging and sent programming exercises that the victim downloaded and ran on a company computer [6]. ESET attributes the attack to Lazarus with a high level of confidence, states that the goal was espionage [6], and notes that the victims used work computers for personal purposes and that the success rate of these campaigns has not dropped to zero [6].

### December 2023: Star Blizzard as seen by CISA

On 7 December 2023, CISA published advisory AA23-341A, together with the NCSC (UK) and other agencies [4]. These agencies assess that Star Blizzard is almost certainly subordinate to Center 18 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) [4]. Since 2019, the group has targeted academia, defense, government, NGOs, think tanks and politicians [4]. The advisory notes that Star Blizzard has been observed setting up fake profiles on professional networking sites to carry out its reconnaissance, and that it creates profiles that imitate respected experts [4].

## Sources

1. MITRE ATT&CK, "Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts, Sub-technique T1585.001 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®". https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585/001/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
2. NCSC (UK), "SEABORGIUM and TA453 continue their respective spear-phishing campaigns against targets of interest", 26 January 2023. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/spear-phishing-campaigns-targets-of-interest (accessed 14 November 2026)
3. NCSC (UK), "Social Media: how to use it safely", 24 January 2019. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/social-media-how-to-use-it-safely (accessed 14 November 2026)
4. CISA, "Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spearphishing Campaigns | CISA", 7 December 2023. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-341a (accessed 14 November 2026)
5. Google, "Stealing the LIGHTSHOW (Part One): North Korea's UNC2970", 9 March 2023. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/lightshow-north-korea-unc2970/ (accessed 14 November 2026)
6. ESET, "Lazarus luring employees with trojanized coding challenges: The case of a Spanish aerospace company", 29 September 2023. https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/lazarus-luring-employees-trojanized-coding-challenges-case-spanish-aerospace-company/ (accessed 14 November 2026)

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